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LIVE HEARINGS AND PAPER TRIALS
MARK SPOTTSWOOD∗
ABSTRACT
This Article explores a constantly recurring procedural question: When is fact-finding
improved by a live hearing or trial, and when would it be better to rely on a written record?
Unfortunately, when judges, lawyers, and rulemakers consider this issue, they are led astray
by the widely shared—but false—assumption that a judge can best determine issues of credibility by viewing the demeanor of witnesses while they are testifying. In fact, a large body of
scientific evidence indicates that judges are more likely to be deceived by lying or mistaken
witnesses when observing live testimony than if the judges were to review a paper transcript.
Witness presence, in other words, may often harm, rather than improve, the accuracy of credibility assessments. The fact that legal actors value hearings for mistaken reasons does not
mean that hearings have no value, but it does raise the concern that live procedure will be
employed when it is unneeded or even counterproductive, especially given the lack of available guidance on this question. In this Article, I attempt to remedy this problem by suggesting some guiding principles that lawyers, courts, and rulemakers could rely on when choosing between live and paper-based fact-finding.
Live hearings and trials will often, but not always, do more harm than good. In addition
to the fact that demeanor cues generally impair credibility judgments, there are a number of
cognitive biases that may arise from having one’s first impressions of a witness be visual and
auditory impressions. These include a persistent human tendency to trust or distrust witnesses based on their physical attractiveness, their social status, their race, or other features
that may make them similar to, or different than, the fact-finder. On the flip side, live factfinding may help a judge make sense of confusing evidence. In addition, in-court hearings
may feel fairer to participants than paper-based decisions, due in large part to the desire to
have expressive input in decisions that affect their well-being. And occasionally, a live hearing or trial may be preferable for reasons of cost or practicality.
A better understanding of the costs and benefits of live fact-finding could have profound
implications for the design of our civil justice system. Our current approach relies on predominantly paper-based, pretrial fact-finding, followed in rare cases by a live trial process.
Unfortunately, this system uses paper-based procedures at a point when live hearings may
often be cheaper and more reliable, then shifts to live examination when its benefits will
have evaporated and its costs are likely to be prohibitive. A preferable system would allow
for more live hearings early in a case. Even when there is no direct credibility conflict, live
proof at this stage may increase the legitimacy of rulings, may lower litigation costs, and
will often be more reliable than the paper-based alternative of affidavit evidence. By contrast, rulemakers should be more willing to authorize—and judges should be more willing to
use—paper trials at the final fact-finding stage of a dispute. At this late stage, live procedure
is expensive and unreliable, and as a result litigants use it so rarely that it provides them
with few opportunities for self-expression. In short, we should reverse our present approach
to civil case fact-finding by holding more live pretrial hearings and more paper trials.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In American civil procedure, some of our metaphors draw heavily
on a shared cultural image: the viva voce civil jury trial. If we wish to
say that a litigant has a right to exercise some personal control over
the presentation of arguments and evidence in a proceeding that
might affect her rights, we say that she has the right to her “day in
court”1—even though the vast majority of cases are resolved by settlement or by pretrial motion, rather than by a trial.2 Likewise, when
we refer to a person’s due process rights to present evidence and
make arguments to a court, we say that she has a right “to be
heard,”3 even though the litigant (and even her counsel) may participate
in those proceedings by many other means than speaking to the court.
The language of procedure is permeated with a presumption of
presence—a default assumption that adjudication of a dispute requires the physical, visual, and aural immediacy furnished by a traditional trial environment. This assumption persists despite the fact
that many case resolutions occur via motion practice or private settlement negotiations that deviate widely from the traditional model
1. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 846 (1999); 18A CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
4449 (2d ed. 2002).
2. See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related
Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 482-84 (2004); Gillian K. Hadfield, Where Have All the Trials Gone? Settlements, Nontrial Adjudications, and
Statistical Artifacts in the Changing Disposition of Federal Civil Cases, 1 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 705, 730 tbl.7 (2004); see also Ronald J. Allen, Laudan, Stein, and the Limits
of Theorizing About Juridical Proof, 29 L. & PHIL. 195, 207-08 (2010) (book review) (characterizing trials as an oddity reserved for those “perverse” cases in which the ordinary means
of dispute resolution have failed).
3. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985).
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of a live trial.4 Once we have noticed this default assumption, a question presents itself: How well is the legal system served by a procedural mindset that automatically equates “in person” procedures
with “fair” procedures?
I aim to explore that question in this Article, by assessing the
costs and benefits of live hearings and trials in the resolution of civil
disputes.5 It is a question that legal decisionmakers must answer implicitly on a nearly constant basis—to the extent that the question
becomes a form of legal white noise. The litigating attorney must decide
whether to ask for an evidentiary hearing or whether to seek a live
trial; the judge must decide when to grant one or proceed on a paper
record instead; the rulemaker must decide what (if any) rules are
necessary to guide the judge’s discretion. Each time, someone is relying on a set of assumptions about whether the presence of the parties
and the sights and sounds of live testimony are a help or a hindrance.
And precisely because legal actors must so often decide what value to
place on in-person procedures, any defects in their decisionmaking in
this area are likely to be magnified when seen from a distance. Small
introductions of error or dissatisfaction—aggregated across the entire
system—may lead to large-scale inefficiencies or inequities.
Despite the frequent affirmation of the value of presence in the
fact-finding process by legal thinkers, we shall see that live hearings
and trials sometimes aid, but often hinder, the fair adjudication of
disputes. In the sections that follow, I aim to establish the following
propositions. First, legal decisionmakers are regularly forced to decide whether live procedure is useful in a particular circumstance or
in a particular class of cases. But despite the ubiquity of this question, the utility of such presence is poorly understood by judges and
under-theorized by academics. Most judges assume that live hearings
increase accuracy by adding the demeanor of witnesses into the informational environment, thereby increasing their ability to tell
whether a witness is being deceptive or inaccurate. But in fact, demeanor cues are more likely to mislead judges than to edify them;
demeanor, in other words, is a tool that liars use to appear more
credible. Moreover, live testimony introduces other sources of bias
4. See ROBERT P. BURNS, THE DEATH OF THE AMERICAN TRIAL 82-83 (2009). Burns
describes the radical decline in the number of federal cases that are resolved by a trial, from
approximately twenty-five percent of cases at the beginning of the twentieth century to less
than two percent today. Id. A similar decline has occurred in state practice. Id. at 85-86.
5. Similar questions could profitably be asked in a variety of related legal contexts.
Live procedures are the norm for the resolution of criminal disputes, and they are quite
common in the administrative agency context. In both arenas such procedures may be subject to the same difficulties I discuss infra concerning civil case fact-finding, although
unique cost considerations and expectations concerning fairness in such settings would
require considerable additional analysis. The decision to limit the inquiry to the civil
procedure context, therefore, flows primarily from a desire to keep this discussion to a
manageable scope.
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that may lead decisionmaking astray. Viewing a witness in person
may encourage a judge to unconsciously credit or distrust testimony
based on factors that have little to do with accuracy, including a desire to affiliate with high status or attractive witnesses or an innate
tendency to trust witnesses who are members of one’s own social ingroup more than members of an out-group.
But this does not mean that live procedures are without value.
Despite the concerns expressed above, live testimony can aid in accurate decisionmaking if it adds factual information that would be absent from a paper record—such as through a successful crossexamination of a poorly prepared witness. Furthermore, live factfinding may sometimes be a lower-cost method of deciding a dispute,
depending on the state of the evidentiary record when a decision
must be made. Live procedures also have “softer” values that the legal system cannot afford to ignore: They are part of a process that
signals to litigants that the legal system respects their dignity as
persons even when it rejects their arguments. Such signals are an
important way that the legal system projects an aura of legitimacy
and thereby obtains public compliance with the law.
Ultimately, to decide whether a live or a paper-based procedure is
preferable in a given situation, we should weigh these concerns of
objective accuracy, subjective legitimacy, and cost against each other.
By doing so, we shall see that many standard assumptions about
when hearings are useful and when they are not are probably flawed,
and that these flawed assumptions have resulted in a perverse set of
practices in civil litigation. For instance, we regularly employ paper
procedures early in a case but almost uniformly prefer live trials for
the final fact-finding process. But attending to the costs and benefits
of presence shows that this preference is very nearly the opposite of a
sensible balance between accuracy, legitimacy, and cost considerations. Early in the life of a case, holding a live hearing may add reliability to fact-finding at little expense, particularly when the alternative is affidavit proof. After a lengthy pretrial process, however, the
considerations are inverted: well-prepared witnesses can frustrate
what few truth-seeking advantages a live trial may provide, while
the high-costs and uncertainty of that procedure will induce many
parties to settle and thereby lose the opportunity to argue the merits
of their cases to a court. In other words, instead of our current habit
of conducting paper motion practice followed (rarely) by a live trial, a
more sensible approach would be to hold more live evidentiary hearings early in the life of a case, followed by a paper trial if the parties
cannot settle.
This Article will proceed in five parts. First, I will attempt to show
the relevance of the question under discussion by illustrating the
ways that practitioners, judges, and rulemakers depend on their abil-
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ity to accurately assess the value of live testimony. Second, I will discuss the costs and benefits that live procedures can impose on our
ability to reach accurate determinations in the face of conflicting evidence. Third, I will examine the normative and practical factors that
may counsel in favor of live testimony, even when it might add inaccuracy or expense. Fourth, I will discuss the effect of live hearings
and trials on litigation costs. Fifth, I will attempt to demonstrate how
these concerns play out in several real-world situations in which
judges must evaluate the utility of in-person procedures. Using these
examples, I will then suggest a proposed reform to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure that would strike a better balance between live
and paper-based fact-finding.
II. A TALE OF THREE DECISIONMAKERS
The question explored in this Article—whether a live hearing or
trial will be an aid or a hindrance to decisionmaking in a given context—has relevance for participants at every level of the legal system. Lawyers must rely on a theory of live procedure (even if it is an
implicit one) in order to make many decisions regarding litigation
strategy. Likewise, judges are often called upon to decide whether
live testimony is valuable in the context of a particular case, and procedural rulemakers must make more general decisions about the
utility of viva voce procedures for particular types of judicial decisions. Often, the decisionmaker in question may not realize that a
value-laden choice is being made, in part because the decision is one
that is made so routinely. But the very ubiquity of the decision
means that small errors in assessing the costs and benefits of live
procedures can be magnified into substantial problems when viewed
from a systemic perspective.
A lawyer must decide how much value she places on in-person
procedure at the very outset of litigation. For one thing, she must decide whether she wishes to demand a jury trial.6 In making this decision, one important consideration is how much value she places on a
live trial. In bench-trial cases, courts will sometimes agree to employ
a paper trial procedure in which they reach a decision based only on
a paper record, dispensing with a live trial.7 No parallel practice exists with respect to jury-trial cases, however. So, our hypothetical attorney makes an implicit decision regarding the value of viva voce
presentation when she decides whether or not to seek a trial by jury

6. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII; FED. R. CIV. P. 38(b) (requiring that a demand be
made within fourteen days of the last relevant pleading in federal court cases).
7. See, e.g., Muller v. First Unum Life Ins. Co., 341 F.3d 119 (2d Cir. 2003); Lac
Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Voigt, 700 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1983).
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and (if she has waived a jury trial) later in the case when she decides
whether to seek a paper trial.8
Furthermore, our lawyer will reprise this decision many times
during her lawsuit. The federal rules of procedure and evidence
require judges to make many non-dispositive findings of fact in advance of trial. For instance, a judge in a civil case may need to decide
whether to grant a preliminary injunction,9 whether to certify a class
action,10 whether to compel arbitration,11 or whether to admit scientific evidence.12 However, because a court will often have discretion
as to whether or not it needs to hold a hearing in order to make such
decisions,13 an attorney has the option of asking the court to do
its pretrial fact-finding on the basis of either an oral hearing or a
written record.
Judges, of course, are forced to address these concerns as well. In
some cases the choice between live procedures and paper procedures
will have been made for them. For instance, a judge has no discretion
to deny a jury trial once demanded by a party in a proper case.14 Similarly, local rules or circuit precedent may constrain the ability of
judges to make pretrial findings of fact in the manner of their choosing.15 But often, a judge will have no authority to rely upon, and in

8. To dispel any confusion, I must make clear that the value of in-person procedure is
only one of many factors that will or should bear on the jury-trial-waiver question. For
example, in some cases, lawyers may believe that a jury will view their case more favorably
than a judge would—or vice versa. Likewise, lawyers may prefer a live bench trial over a
live jury trial for cost reasons, without regard to the possible availability of a paper trial
procedure. And it is quite possible that litigators who specialize in subject matters in which
paper trials are very rare may be unaware of the device’s existence and thus fail to realize
that a choice about the jury trial issue has this additional implication.
9. See FED. R. CIV. P. 65(a). See also Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 392
(1981) (describing the findings of fact necessary to support a preliminary injunction).
10. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
11. See 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2006).
12. See FED. R. EVID. 702. Similar situations may arise in many other forums, of
course. In a criminal case, for instance, fact-finding may be necessary to support a decision
regarding pretrial detention or suppression of evidence, and judges may have discretion in
such settings regarding the manner in which proof will be taken. See, e.g., 1A CHARLES
ALAN WRIGHT & ANDREW D. LEIPOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 194 (4th ed.
2008) (suppression hearings). Likewise, arbitration and administrative law procedures
may often grant non-judicial fact-finders the authority to decide whether or not a hearing
will be useful.
13. See, e.g., 7AA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1785 (3d ed. 2005) (class action certification); 9 U.S.C. § 6 (2006)
(motion to compel arbitration in non-jury-demand cases); CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER &
LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, 3 FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 7:17 (3d ed. 2007) (Daubert inquiry).
14. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII; FED. R. CIV. P. 38.
15. See, e.g., Merrill v. S. Methodist Univ., 806 F.2d 600, 608 (5th Cir. 1986) (noting
that Fifth Circuit precedent requires district courts to hold evidentiary hearings whenever
a class certification is not “free from doubt”).
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stead she will be forced to weigh the costs and benefits of a live proceeding without guidance.16
Judges may be relying on implicit assumptions about the value of
viva voce procedure even when the issue is not explicitly presented.
Quite often, a judge might find that a case falls within a zone of ambiguity when applying a rule that may either dispose of that case, or
allow it to proceed to a bench or jury trial.17 For instance, consider a
motion for summary judgment in which a judge is unsure whether
the parties have created a material dispute of fact, perhaps because
the submissions of the parties are somewhat vague as to key points of
evidence.18 When legal questions become close, policy judgments may
begin to play a larger role in the decisionmaking.19 In such a position,
a judge might be influenced by her assumptions as to whether the
additional proceedings are likely to improve the accuracy of the case’s
outcome or merely take up extra judicial time. Thus, a judge might
end up granting summary judgment based on a view that live testimony will materially aid her subsequent decisionmaking or deny it
based on a view that a live trial will be long on expense but short on
new information.
Similarly, judges regularly review the work of other judges and
decisionmakers, sometimes within a single court system (as in the
case of a direct appeal) and sometimes across institutional lines (as
in the case of administrative review). In this context, they often must
apply rules of deference, which instruct them to give extra weight to
decisions that follow a hearing.20 Such rules are necessarily under16. Compare Gingras v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., No. 06 C 2195, 2007 WL 1052500,
at *7 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 4, 2007) (declining to try a case on a paper record despite the parties’
stipulation to such a procedure), with Migliorisi v. Walgreens Disability Benefits Plan, No.
06 C 3290, 2008 WL 904883, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2008) (employing a paper-based decision procedure in a case involving credibility disputes).
17. For example, summary judgment decisions may often hinge on whether a particular dispute is characterized as a question of fact, which a court must view “ ‘in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party,’ ” Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2677 (2009)
(quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007)), or a question of law, to which no such
rule of restraint applies. Deciding whether a particular dispute is one of fact, of law, or the
application of law to fact will often involve a surprising amount of practical judicial discretion, given that “ ‘the journey from a pure question of fact to a pure question of law is one of
subtle gradations rather than one marked by a rigid divide.’ ” Burlington N. R.R. Co. v.
Hyundai Merchant Marine Co., Ltd. 63 F.3d 1227, 1235 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting United
States v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 464 U.S. 165, 171 n.4 (1984)).
18. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56.
19. See Ward Farnsworth, Dustin F. Guzior & Anup Malani, Ambiguity About Ambiguity: An Empirical Inquiry into Legal Interpretation, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 257, 271-72
(2010) (noting that, when a legal text may be read as “ambiguous” in some senses but not
in others, interpreters may be influenced by policy preferences when deciding whether to
call it “ambiguous” or “clear”).
20. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2006) (“The findings of the Commissioner of Social
Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive” upon review in an action in federal court to set aside the Commissioner’s decision); 8 U.S.C. §
1252(b)(4)(B) (providing that, when a court of appeals reviews an immigration decision,
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determinative; they can tell judges to defer, but they cannot say exactly when deference must give way to the reviewing court’s own
judgment in a particular case. The gap must be filled by recourse to
judicial judgment, and that judgment will be informed, either implicitly or explicitly,21 by the reviewing court’s impression of the value of
the differing vantage point of the first court.
Finally, rulemakers (whether acting as rule drafters22 or when voting to approve or reject proposed rules23) must wrestle with these
concerns as well. In some instances, they take explicit stances regarding the value of viva voce procedure. For example, Civil Rule
52(a)(6) admonishes appellate courts to defer to trial-court findings of
fact and pay “due regard to the trial court’s opportunity to judge the
witnesses’ credibility,”24 which is, in effect, a codification of the assumption that in-person proceedings are likely to be more accurate
than a review of the record. But it is not only such explicit statements that implicate the value of live procedure. Even silence regarding the method by which facts should be communicated to a court involves at least an implicit understanding that neither live nor paper
procedure is so much more reliable that it should be mandated as a
general means of proceeding.
In theory, rulemakers can require live hearings, forbid them, or
leave the decision to the discretion of judges. Most often, the rules
say nothing with respect to whether hearings are preferred to paper
decisionmaking, which is effectively an election in favor of the third
option. By saying nothing, a rulemaker signals one of two things: either the decision is not important enough to warrant a rule, or an ex
ante rule is likely to be of lower quality than a contextualized exercise of judicial discretion. Either way, however, a committee making
“the administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would
be compelled to conclude to the contrary”); FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6) (instructing “reviewing
court[s] [to] . . . give due regard to the trial court’s opportunity to judge the witnesses’ credibility” and to affirm trial court findings unless they are “clearly erroneous”). But cf. FED.
R. CIV. P. 72(b)(3) (requiring district judges to give fresh consideration to the pretrial factfinding of a magistrate judge).
21. Cf. Mitondo v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 784, 787-88 (7th Cir. 2008) (providing an unusually nuanced assessment of the differing perspectives and capabilities of an immigration
judge and an appellate court with respect to determinations of an asylum applicant’s credibility).
22. See Paul J. Stancil, Close Enough for Government Work: The Committee Rulemaking Game, 96 VA. L. REV. 69, 76-78 (2010) (describing the rulemaking process established
by 28 U.S.C. § 2073 (2006), which delegates the drafting of rules to advisory committees
made up of delegates from the federal bench of bar, and noting that in practice, the drafting of rules often involves a dialogue between these advisory committees and the Federal
Judicial Conference’s Standing Committee on Rules of Practice, Procedure, and Evidence).
23. See id. at 107-08 (noting that the proposed rules drafted by an advisory committee
must pass through a number of veto gates, and that the Standing Committee, the Judicial
Conference, the Supreme Court, and Congress all have the ability to stop a rule from going
into effect).
24. FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6).
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rules that govern the litigation environment must constantly take
some sort of stand as to either the value of presence specifically, or
the superiority of judges in determining the best decisionmaking environment for each particular case context.
Because so many actors, at so many levels of the legal system,
must regularly decide how useful live procedures are, even a small
upgrade to their ability to accurately weigh the relevant costs and
benefits can have large consequences when aggregated across the
litigation system. Unfortunately, however, such decisions are often
made unreflectively, from the gut and (in part because of the relative
silence of rulemakers) without much guidance from authoritative
sources. As a result, we have little reason to be confident that the average legal actor’s concept of live procedure’s advantages and disadvantages is well tuned. Indeed, as we shall see, close attention to this
question shows that judges and rulemakers regularly rely on intuitions that are at best dubious, and at worst factually false, when
thinking about these questions.
III. OBJECTIVE FAIRNESS: THE ACCURACY VALUE
Few values are as fundamental to our system of adjudication as
accuracy—the interest in reaching outcomes that correctly describe
past events.25 For this reason, when a judge or rulemaker must decide
whether to hear live evidence on a particular topic, the focus is often
on whether doing so is likely to produce a more accurate decision.
Unfortunately, some of the intuitions on which the legal system relies regarding the relationship between live testimony and accuracy
are not sound. Although it is often presumed that a live hearing or
trial generally makes a decision more accurate, the reality is that
judges will often render less accurate decisions after watching live
testimony than they would if they had relied on a paper record instead.
A. Judicial Intuitions Concerning the Value of Demeanor Evidence
One of the most frequently expressed intuitions regarding the utility of viva voce procedures is that they aid fact-finders in determining
whether witnesses are testifying credibly. This assumption has a
long history in the law. At one time, the superiority of visual examination seemed so obvious that many courts refused to seat blind people as jurors: “[S]urely,” reflected one court, “no one who cannot see
25. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (noting that preventing
“the risk of an erroneous deprivation” of a legal interest is a key component of the constitutional right to due process); Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181,
183 (2004) (noting that procedural justice is “concerned with the benefits of accuracy”); cf.
ALVIN I. GOLDMAN, KNOWLEDGE IN A SOCIAL WORLD 59-68 (1999) (defending the notion
that a statement is true if it successfully describes events in the world).
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the expression of faces, nor observe deportment and demeanor, can
justly weigh testimony.”26 Dean Wigmore, in his treatise on judicial
proof, endorsed a similar principle: “[N]o intentional derogation from
the truth can take place without a tendency to muscular contractions
or expansions,— phenomena of inhibition or excitation.”27
This belief has gained wide purchase in American law.28 One author, discussing the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause, noted
that “[t]here is . . . a secondary advantage to be obtained by the personal appearance of the witness: the judge and the jury are enabled
to obtain the elusive and incommunicable evidence of a witness’ deportment while testifying . . . .”29 Such views persist today: The Supreme Court has suggested that a witness, when facing a live defendant, may be “confound[ed]” and reveal his deceptive intent through
visual cues, such as “studiously” avoiding the defendant’s gaze.30
Guided by such considerations, the Second Circuit has suggested that
the right of confrontation is impaired when jurors cannot see a witness’s eyes, but that such defects can be mitigated if they can at least
observe a witness’s “body language.”31
This idea is also firmly ensconced in the relationship between an
initial fact-finder and a subsequent reviewing court. In the direct appeal process, reviewing courts are advised to “give due regard to the
trial court’s opportunity to judge the witnesses’ credibility.”32 Likewise, when reviewing the work of administrative fact-finders, courts
often give special weight to the initial findings of a hearing officer,
even if his conclusions were dismissed by his administrative superiors following an administrative appeal. The reasoning follows a familiar refrain: The Supreme Court noted that hearing officers, but
not their superiors, had the “opportunity to observe the witnesses” at
a hearing.33 For this reason, when an agency disagrees with one of its
hearing officers, its findings may be subject to extra scrutiny depending in part on the “importance of credibility in the particular case.”34
Similarly, courts have focused on a witness’s appearance as a
guide to accuracy as well as sincerity. Many courts refuse to allow

26. Rhodes v. State, 27 N.E. 866, 868 (Ind. 1891).
27. JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, THE PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL PROOF 493 (2d ed. 1931) (quoting G.L. DUPRAT, LE MESONGE: ETUDE DE PSYCHOLOGIE (2d ed. 1909))(emphasis omitted).
28. But cf. Mitondo v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 784, 788 (7th Cir. 2008) (providing what
may be the only significant counterexample to the judicial trend approving of the probative
value of demeanor evidence as a credibility signal).
29. 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1395 (Chadbourn rev. 1974) (emphasis omitted).
30. See Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1019-20 (1988).
31. Morales v. Artuz, 281 F.3d 55, 60-62 (2d Cir. 2002) (concluding that a witness
could testify while wearing dark sunglasses without violating the Confrontation Clause, so
long as the jury could observe other aspects of her demeanor).
32. FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6).
33. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 492-97 (1951).
34. Id. at 496.
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experts to testify regarding the baseline reliability of eyewitness testimony, 35 and demeanor evidence provides a central part of the justification for excluding such evidence. For instance, in rejecting expert
testimony that eyewitness confidence was rarely predictive of eyewitness accuracy, the Second Circuit opined that “assessing witness
credibility” was a fundamental part of a jury’s role, that a jury could
rely upon “a witness’s demeanor on the stand, including his or her
confidence” in order to assess the reliability of an identification, and
that the proffered expert testimony would intrude on this special role
of the jury.36
This view is articulated most directly when judges consider
whether it is appropriate to hold a trial “on the papers” by the consent of the parties. In his article advocating an expanded use of this
device, Magistrate Judge Denlow issued a word of caution: “In an instance when a credibility determination is at the heart of the case, a
waiver of the right to bring in live witnesses does not make sense”
because “a judge . . . can best decide credibility by seeing the witness.”37 This view has been echoed by other judges: In a case where
the parties “place great weight on the credibility of their own doctors
in contrast to the alleged bias of the other party’s physicians,” one
district court judge decided to hold a hearing despite the fact that
both parties preferred a paper trial, stating that “[i]t simply is not
possible for the Court to make the credibility determinations the parties argue are necessary by reviewing only the paper record.”38
B. The Reality: Demeanor Evidence Undercuts the Accuracy of
Credibility Judgments
Unfortunately, the widespread assumption that fact-finders can
improve their credibility assessments by attending to demeanor is
false. In fact, demeanor evidence is a poor tool for detecting either
deliberate deception or mistaken recollection. A substantial body of
social science evidence indicates that visually observing witnesses at
best contributes nothing to a credibility determination and at worst
increases the likelihood that a fact-finder will get it wrong.39

35. See Richard A. Wise et al., How to Analyze the Accuracy of Eyewitness Testimony
in a Criminal Case, 42 CONN. L. REV. 435, 452-54 (2009); 31A AM. JUR. 2D Expert and
Opinion Evidence § 337 n.4 (2010) (collecting state cases excluding such evidence).
36. United States v. Lumpkin, 192 F.3d 280, 289 (2d Cir. 1999); see also Arnstein v.
Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 471-72 (2d Cir. 1946).
37. Morton Denlow, Trial on the Papers: An Alternative to Cross-Motions for Summary
Judgment, FED. LAW., August 1999, at 30, 32.
38. Gingras v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., No. 06 C 2195, 2007 WL 1052500, at *7
(N.D. Ill. Apr. 4, 2007).
39. See generally Charles F. Bond, Jr. & Bella M. DePaulo, Accuracy of Deception
Judgments, 10 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 214 (2006) (collecting and analyzing
over 200 deception studies).
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Studies consistently show that the average person’s success rate
in detecting a lie while watching the liar is little better than chance.
Nor is this situation greatly changed by expertise. Most law enforcement officials, mental health professionals, and (most pertinent to
the current investigation) judges can detect a lie based on visual cues
at levels only slightly exceeding chance.40
At first blush, this information may seem counterintuitive to
many. It may seem natural to assume that we are good at detecting
lies. Indeed, we depend upon this skill to a great extent in our everyday lives, in that we assume we would be able to tell if we were being
deceived. The problem, however, is that liars can easily introspect on
the cues that they would look for to determine sincerity, and fake
them. Most people tell lies at least once each day,41 thereby getting
the opportunity to practice the skills of duplicity in numerous, relatively low-risk acts of social deception. As a result, the average person is a better feigner of sincerity than detector of sincerity. One pair
40. Id. at 229-30 (concluding, in a meta-analysis of over 200 deception studies, that
both experts and non-experts have an accuracy rate below fifty-five percent, with no significant gain being realized by expertise); Paul Ekman & Maureen O’Sullivan, Who Can
Catch a Liar?, 46 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 913, 916 (1991) (examining a number of occupations,
including judges, polygraphists, robbery investigators, Secret Service agents, and psychiatrists, and finding an accuracy rate of approximately fifty-five percent for all groups except
the Secret Service, who had a slightly higher accuracy rate of sixty-four percent). Ekman
and O’Sullivan later conducted a study that purported to show that experts could achieve
heightened levels of accuracy; this study selected groups of experts (including psychologists, judges, and law enforcement investigators), some of whom had “special interest or
expertise” in detecting deception and who had attended special workshops on detecting
deception. See Paul Ekman, Maureen O’Sullivan, & Mark G. Frank, A Few Can Catch a
Liar, 10 PSYCHOL. SCI. 263, 263–64 (1999). This study found accuracy rates as high as seventy-three percent (among federal officers with special deception-detection experience who
had attended a day-long workshop on the topic), and other deception-interested groups who
had attended such workshops also showed detection rates above sixty percent (local sheriffs, federal judges, and clinical psychologists). Id. at 265. Subsequent investigators have
cautioned, however, that the “results of these training studies are mixed,” with some studies showing a training improvement, others showing no effects, and still others showing
that training actually impairs lie detection. Aldert Vrij, Criteria-Based Content Analysis: A
Qualitative Review of the First 37 Studies, 11 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 3, 22-23 (2005); see
also Maureen O’Sullivan et al., Police Lie Detection Accuracy: The Effect of Lie Scenario, 33
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 530, 534 (2009) (reanalyzing twenty-three studies involving law enforcement officers’ attempts to detect deception and finding that officers outperformed novice lie-detectors, showing sixty-four percent accuracy as compared with fifty-five percent
among the novices, when the truth/lie sample involved “high stakes” for the deceiver in a
manner similar to what an officer would encounter in a real-world interview scenario);
Saul M. Kassin & Gisli H. Gudjonsson, The Psychology of Confessions: A Review of the Literature and Issues, 5 PSYCHOL. SCI. IN THE PUB. INT. 33, 38 (2004) (describing studies in
which training lowered the quality of deception judgments while raising the confidence of
the trained subjects that their judgments were correct). The overall picture appears to be
consistent with the Bond, Jr. & DePaulo meta-analysis: Neither lie-detection training nor
professional experience with lie-detection are reliably associated with accuracy improvements. See Bond, Jr. & DePaulo, supra note 39.
41. See Mark G. Frank, Thoughts, Feelings, and Deception, in DECEPTION: FROM ANCIENT EMPIRES TO INTERNET DATING 55, 56 (Brook Harrington ed., 2009) (noting that “when
people keep diaries of their lies, they report telling one to two falsified accounts each day”).
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of researchers, summarizing their meta-analysis of existing studies,
framed the problem as follows:
[While] lay people believe that certain nonverbal behaviors are
strongly associated with deception . . . these beliefs are actually diametrically opposed to those observed to be indicators of deception
in experimental studies. For example, although people generally
believe that deception is accompanied by an increase in hand
movements as well as in foot and leg movements and nodding, these behaviors actually decrease when people are lying. . . . [Although] people assume that blinks, illustrators, and postural shifts
increase when people are lying, . . . there seems to be no association with these behaviors in this meta-analysis. Only for some behaviors do beliefs match the direction of the associations observed—perhaps a decrease in (genuine) smiles. Nonetheless, even
with these behaviors, the magnitude of the association is assumed
to be much stronger than it actually is . . . .42

In short, most of us do not know what to look for to visually detect
deception, and we have not yet developed reliable training methods
that overcome this limitation.
The story is equally grim when we consider testimony that is not
outright deceptive, but rather mistaken. “Numerous studies have
[shown] . . . that subject jurors are unable to do better than chance in
distinguishing between accurate and inaccurate eyewitness identifications, and that the jurors accord inappropriate weight to witness
confidence.”43 Simply stated, the problem is that people tend to overrely on witness confidence as a proxy for witness accuracy. Unfortunately, confidence appears to be poorly correlated with accuracy in

42. Siegfried L. Sporer & Barbara Schwandt, Moderators of Nonverbal Indicators of
Deception: A Meta-Analytic Synthesis, 13 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 1, 26 (2007); see also
Jeremy A. Blumenthal, A Wipe of the Hands, a Lick of the Lips: The Validity of Demeanor
Evidence in Assessing Witness Credibility, 72 NEB. L. REV. 1157, 1165-66 (1993) (discussing
physical signals that have been thought indicative of lying); Richard L. Marcus, Completing Equity’s Conquest? Reflections on the Future of Trial Under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 725, 758 (1989) (noting that judges and juries may misinterpret the nervousness of truth-telling witnesses as a symptom of deception “because of demeanor evidence that is misunderstood”).
43. Olin Guy Wellborn III, Demeanor, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1075, 1089 (1991) (also
listing studies); see VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 128 (1986). Nor
does the situation improve when real attorneys are recruited to subject the mistaken witnesses to cross-examination. In one study, 178 participants viewed mock trials in which
accurate and inaccurate witnesses were subjected to the full panoply of examination, crossexamination, and redirect examination, without time limit. R.C.L. Lindsay, Gary L. Wells,
& Fergus O’Connor, Mock-Juror Belief of Accurate and Inaccurate Eyewitnesses: A Replication and Extension, 13 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 333, 333, 335 (1989). The results were unsettling: Mock jurors who heard eyewitness testimony voted seventy-two percent of the time
to convict the identified person of a “crime,” and even where eyewitnesses were discredited,
sixty-eight percent of mock jurors voted to support conviction of the mis-identified person.
See HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 43, at 128.
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testimony, so this reliance leads us astray.44 It seems reasonable to
worry that fact-finders would make a similar error when assessing
other examples of inaccurate, but confident, witness testimony.
C. Addressing the Demeanor-Evidence Problem
Scholars who have confronted this disparity between judicial assumptions and cognitive reality have mainly fallen into two camps.
Some have attempted to find ways to minimize the degree of error
induced by reliance on demeanor from the hearing process. Jeremy
Blumenthal, for example, urges that the problem could be partially
overcome by hiding witnesses behind screens, or else by instructing
juries to base credibility judgments on what a witness says and the
way in which they say it, but not on how they appear while speaking.45 But this advice has limited utility for two reasons: First, Blumenthal relies significantly on the assumption that tone of voice is a
“leaky” channel, which will betray deceptive intent despite the attempts of liars to conceal their emotional state.46 But a meta-analysis
of deception-detection studies indicates that judges who rely on audio
recordings in trying to detect lies do not significantly out-perform
those who rely only on transcripts.47 There is little reason to think,
therefore, that the vocal presence of witnesses will make a trialbehind-a-screen more accurate than a trial-on-the-papers. Second, by
focusing almost entirely on the jury trial environment, Blumenthal
looks at a context that is both limiting (because the Seventh Amendment and tradition constrain decisionmakers from dispensing with
presence) and rare (because very few cases are disposed of by jury
trial in the modern system).48 So he does not ask the question explored here: Do the limits of demeanor evidence undercut the accuracy rationale for taking live testimony altogether?
Some scholars have addressed this question, although they have
focused primarily on the trial environment, rather than the wider
variety of situations in which a hearing might be employed to help a
court reach a decision. Max Minzner responds to the demeanor deficit
by noting that “[w]hile liars do not give off demeanor cues, they do
tell stories that are less logical, less consistent, and contain fewer

44. See Robert K. Bothwell, Social Cognition in the Courtroom: Juror Information
Processing and Story Construction, in A HANDBOOK OF JURY RESEARCH 17-1, 17-20 (Walter
F. Abbott & John Batt eds., 1999); Kenneth R. Weingardt, R. Jacob Leonesio & Elizabeth
F. Loftus, Viewing Eyewitness Research from a Metacognitive Perspective, in METACOGNITION: KNOWING ABOUT KNOWING 157, 164 (Janet Metcalfe & Arthur P. Shimamura eds.,
1994) (reporting that “much research on eyewitness identification has consistently found
very weak correlations” between witness accuracy and witness confidence).
45. See Blumenthal, supra note 42, at 1201-02.
46. Id. at 1189-91.
47. See Bond, Jr. & DePaulo, supra note 39, at 225.
48. See Galanter, supra note 2, at 482-84; Hadfield, supra note 2, at 730.
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details than those of truth-tellers.”49 This claim finds some support in
the experimental literature.50 Indeed, the field of Statement Validity
Analysis has responded to the experimental evidence by shifting an
investigator’s focus from demeanor cues to content-based cues, with
judges relying on transcripts produced by an initial interview, and has
produced higher (although far from stellar) rates of accurate lie detection.51 Minzner therefore concludes that juries may be fairly accurate
when they rely on contextual cues or well-calibrated prior probabilities that a witness is lying, even if they will sometimes generate unreliable decisions by relying on demeanor.52 But although this reasoning
undercuts the fear that the legal system will never be able to distinguish truths from lies due to the unreliability of demeanor evidence,
it does not give a reason to prefer in-person to absent procedures.
Olin Wellborn is the only scholar who has directly argued that inperson procedures are superior to absent ones despite the problem of
demeanor evidence. In his view, the fact that “live testimony does not
enhance credibility judgments does not imply that a trial with live
testimony is not the best kind of trial.”53 He suggests several alternative values to live trials. For example, such proceedings may “deter
dishonest witnesses . . . who would lie in a deposition [but who] may
balk at lying in public, in a courtroom, in the physical presence of the
opponent, the judge, and the jury.”54 He also notes that live testimony
may be necessary for the perception of accurate adjudication even if it
does not further actual accuracy—a point we shall return to later.55
Wellborn’s first point—that hearings may enhance accuracy even
if they do not aid credibility determinations—deserves further development. His argument for witness deterrence is somewhat speculative
because we have little data on the degree to which witnesses who are
willing to lie on an affidavit or while being deposed would refuse to
repeat the performance in front of a judge. Some witnesses may be so

49. Max Minzner, Detecting Lies Using Demeanor, Bias, and Context, 29 CARDOZO L.
REV. 2557, 2569 (2008).
50. See, e.g., Bella M. DePaulo et al., Cues to Deception, 129 PSYCHOL. BULL. 74, 102
(2003) (finding that “liars were generally less forthcoming than truth tellers, . . . [that]
their tales were less compelling” to listeners, and that they “provided fewer details than
did truth tellers”).
51. See Vrij, supra note 40, at 23 (finding, in a meta-analysis of relevant studies, an
average accuracy rate of seventy-three percent for detecting truths and seventy-two percent for detecting lies); cf. Bond, Jr. & DePaulo, supra note 39, at 229 (both experts and
non-experts have below a fifty-five percent accuracy rate in discriminating between truths
and lies when viewing a video sample that includes demeanor cues).
52. See Minzner, supra note 49, at 2578.
53. Wellborn, supra note 43, at 1092. He argues that recognition of the demeanor
problem should lead instead to a modest reduction in the deference that appellate courts
apply when they review trial-court fact-finding, as well as to a liberalized use of deposition
evidence at trial, among other recommendations. Id. at 1094-99.
54. Id. at 1092.
55. Id.
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confident in the deposition environment that they feel little pressure
while lying; others may find it terrifying merely to face down an adversary lawyer in a conference room after having been warned that
any deception is subject to the “penalty of perjury.”56 Moreover, this
argument has little purchase in the many cases where deception is
less of an obstacle to fact finding than unintentional gaps or errors in
witness memory. Indeed, we might question whether a witness with
a faulty memory is likely to be more persuasive in a hearing setting
than in a deposition, due to increased preparation and rehearsal of
testimony before the more formal proceeding.57 So if we do make gains
in deterring deception in a live hearing or trial environment, we may
suffer correlative losses in our ability to catch mistaken recollections.
But leaving deterrence of deception aside, there are other ways
that live testimony may contribute to accuracy. Deception is most
likely to be detected by reference to the content of a witness’s claims,
and by comparison of that content to other evidence.58 Several features of live examination can further this process. First, a relatively
unprepared witness can be encouraged during cross-examination to
commit himself to one version of a fabricated account, only to be subsequently confronted by contradictory information. Such tactics,
when employed in investigative situations, have sometimes been able
to produce a high rate of deception detection by inducing and probing
inconsistencies in fabricated accounts.59 There is an important caveat
to this account, however: This “evidence confrontation” strategy relies on the witness being surprised by the direction taken in the ex56. Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(c)(1) (requiring that deponents swear an oath or affirmation
before giving testimony); 2 MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FED. EVID. § 603:1 n.1 (6th
ed. 2006) (noting that “a typical oath is ‘Do you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth and
nothing but the truth, so help you God?’ ” and that “[a] typical affirmation is ‘Do you affirm
to tell the truth under penalty of perjury?’ ”).
57. See Weingardt et al., supra note 44, at 183 (noting that witnesses who are exposed
to false information after an event “consistently demonstrate overconfidence” when recalling their perceptions). In the study reported, many witnesses exposed to contradictory information following an observed event expressed certainty regarding their recollections,
even though their actual rates of accurate recollection were below chance. Id. at 177; cf. id.
at 178 (noting that witnesses who were not exposed to inaccurate information had high
rates of calibration between confidence and accuracy, with “certain” witnesses being correct
approximately ninety percent of the time). As a result, those witnesses who have developed
false recollections as a result of contamination by other sources or attorney suggestion
during testimony preparation may exploit the “confidence equals accuracy” decisionmaking
heuristic, and thereby seem more credible than they should. As confidence is likely to be a
more salient characteristic in a live hearing, and as confidence is likely to increase as testimony is rehearsed before such a hearing, this concern becomes especially significant in
that setting.
58. Compare Vrij, supra note 40, at 24, with Bond, Jr. & DePaulo, supra note 39, at 229.
59. See Minzner, supra note 49, at 2569. Marcus points out that there may be a counter-effect that mitigates the advantages of such a strategy: Pointing to a study examining
the effects of hostile questioning on a fact-finder’s evaluation of witness trustworthiness, he
noted the author’s view that witnesses subjected to confrontational questioning might
“tr[y] harder to be believable,” and succeed. Marcus, supra note 42, at 759.
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amination. If a witness is well-prepared for the encounter and can
anticipate the questions that the investigator is likely to ask, it is
doubtful that the confrontation strategy will be as useful.60
We should therefore be wary of presuming that cross-examination
adds significant value for deception detection when a witness has had
an opportunity to prepare for the encounter and knows the questions
that are likely to be asked.61 This means that the advantages of hearings for detecting deception will vary by situation; questions asked of
an unprepared witness before the two sides have exchanged significant discovery may be very revealing. On the other hand, if a witness
has previously been deposed and has been prepared for the encounter
by an attorney who can easily anticipate the directions that questioning is likely to take, the encounter may reveal little.62 Indeed, the earlier deposition transcript may be more revealing than the subsequent
examination; the witness may have since crafted explanations of earlier inconsistencies that make deceptive content harder, rather than
easier, to detect.
Even when live testimony is unlikely to aid in the detection of deception or error, however, it may increase the accuracy of decisions if
it can make the existing evidence clearer.63 As Marcus has noted,
“there is a difference between reading a treatise and being instructed
by a live expert,”64 and as cases grow more complex that difference
may overwhelm other accuracy considerations. Available depositions
or affidavits may dodge important questions, or presume an understanding of contextual information that a judge does not in fact possess. At a hearing, a judge can interpose her own questions, pinning
down a witness on an important point or requiring a lawyer to explain a complex transaction.65 Likewise, the additional preparation
that may occur before a hearing may allow parties to find ways to
60. See Minzer, supra note 49, at 2569 (noting that this effect relies upon an “informational advantage” on the part of the interrogator); Chris William Sanchirico, “What Makes
the Engine Go?”: Cognitive Limitations and Cross-Examination, 14 WIDENER L. REV. 507,
516 (2009) (noting that “[c]onstructing testimony on the fly is considerably more difficult”
than preparing for questions in advance, and that unanticipated questions are the hardest
for insincere witnesses to answer without giving away the deception); Marcus, supra note
42, at 759; see also DePaulo et al., supra note 50, at 103 (noting that planned presentations
of deceptive testimony are generally harder to detect).
61. See Sanchirico, supra note 60, at 521 (urging that it is “crucial” that crossexamination questions be unanticipated if we desire to place insincere witnesses in a situation where they are likely to slip up).
62. See id.; ROBERT P. BURNS, A THEORY OF THE TRIAL 65 & n.83 (1999) (noting that a
witness’s ability to resist the impulse to be led by a cross-examining attorney into what
appear to be self-serving contradictory statements is a central means by which the witness
can appear credible, and that witness preparation is a key means of ensuring that this
consistency is produced).
63. See Marcus, supra note 42, at 763.
64. Id.
65. See FED. R. EVID. 614 (permitting a court to conduct its own examination of witnesses sua sponte, whether those witnesses were called by a party or by the court itself).

844

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:827

communicate complex information in more digestible ways.66 Of
course, paper has clarity benefits as well: It may be easier to remember technical information when it is read than when it is heard,67 in
part because a reader can interact with written information in ways
that facilitate recall.68 But such advantages are mitigated in the present analysis, which focuses on judicial decisionmaking, given that
judges can order transcripts of hearings and even request supplemental briefing when necessary, allowing them to have the best of
both worlds. So, at least for judges, live hearings and trials have accuracy benefits that are unrelated to deception or witness error: They
allow the clarification of a confusing record through interaction between judges, witnesses, and advocates, and they allow advocates to
present complicated information in ways that may be more intuitive
and understandable for generalist judges.69
D. The Biasing Effects of Witness Appearance
Finally, however, there is one more cost we must weigh in the accuracy balance: In addition to distorting fact-finding through the introduction of unreliable demeanor evidence, hearings may impede
accurate fact-finding by introducing biases for or against particular
witnesses. Two forms of bias are particularly worrisome in this context. The first is the innate human tendency to associate one type of
positive trait with other positive traits that a person might possess,
and to do likewise with negative traits. The second is the human impulse to view members of our social in-groups favorably while seeing
members of out-groups in a darker light. Both of these forms of bias
may distort fact-finding by making a fact-finder trust or distrust witnesses for irrelevant reasons, and both may be exacerbated by meeting the witness in a live hearing environment.

66. See FEDERAL PRACTICE MANUAL FOR LEGAL AID ATTORNEYS 148 (Jeffrey S. Gutman, ed., 2004) (suggesting that oral arguments may be particularly useful when a case
“hinges on complicated concepts”).
67. See Marcus, supra note 42, at 764.
68. Oldfather explains the clarity virtues of text by focusing on the process he
calls “backlooping”:
For an appellate judge viewing a transcript, the words on the page do not appear for only an instant, but instead remain to be reread and reconsidered. This
ability to “backloop” allows the reader to devote less effort to keeping information in memory and thus to allocate more cognitive resources to understanding
the material. The limitations of oral memory no longer constrain the intellectual operations that may be performed with the information conveyed.
Chad M. Oldfather, Appellate Courts, Historical Facts, and the Civil-Criminal Distinction,
57 VAND. L. REV. 437, 455 (2004).
69. See STEVEN LUBET, MODERN TRIAL ADVOCACY 279-80 (3d ed. 2010) (describing the
ways that advocates can employ devices such as models, maps, diagrams, graphs, and
charts to clarify spatial relationships, complicated timelines, or financial information).
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The first form of bias—often referred to as the “halo effect[]”—
invokes our “tendency to assume that like goes with like” so that
“[s]alient information (such as height or attractiveness) activates positive or negative associations that color how people process everything else they learn about an individual.”70 Early impressions of a
person can induce us to like or dislike an individual, and those mental attitudes tend to impact our subsequent evaluations of that person. In one early study, a researcher provided study participants
with a list of characteristics possessed by a hypothetical individual.71
Each participant read a list containing the same overall mix of traits,
but some lists described the favorable characteristics before the negative ones, while other lists fronted the bad news.72 Simply varying the
order in which people read these traits generated a “considerable difference” in the participants’ descriptions of the hypothetical person:
starting with positive traits resulted in an impression of a “predominantly . . . able person who possesses certain shortcomings which do
not, however, overshadow his merits,” while reversing the order led
to the person being perceived “as a ‘problem,’ whose abilities are
hampered by his serious difficulties.”73 So the mere fact that certain
information is learned before other information can radically affect
the final picture we will arrive at even when the differently ordered
information is identical.
One way to account for this tendency is as an example of confirmation bias, our tendency to “seek information that . . . support[s]
[our] . . . existing beliefs and to interpret information in ways that
are partial to those . . . beliefs.”74 Especially when looking at ambiguous
evidence, we are likely to draw inferences in favor of the view we
currently think is most likely. This “primacy effect” leads us to “form
an opinion early in the process and then evaluate subsequently acquired information in a way that is partial to that opinion.”75 To
the extent that our initial impressions rest on a shaky foundation—
such as the mental tendency to relate positively valued surface
characteristics, such as beauty or social status, with valuable underlying characteristics, like intelligence or honesty—we may skew our
70. Andrew J. Wistrich, Chris Guthrie & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Can Judges Ignore
Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REV.
1251, 1266-67 (2005).
71. Id. at 1266.
72. Id.
73. S. E. Asch, Forming Impressions of Personality, 41 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 258, 270 (1948).
74. Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many
Guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175, 177 (1998); see also Shelly Chaiken & Durairaj Maheswaran, Heuristic Processing Can Bias Systematic Processing: Effects of Source Credibility,
Argument Ambiguity, and Task Importance on Attitude Judgment, 66 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 460, 469 (1994) (see discussion infra note 76).
75. Nickerson, supra note 74, at 187.
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resulting judgments of witness credibility or party culpability based
on irrelevancies.76
A number of characteristics revealed during viva voce hearings
and trials might activate the primacy effect in a way that would cast
doubt on the accuracy of fact-finding. Perhaps the most studied form
of the halo effect is the physical appearance bias. In study after
study, people who form impressions of others based on photos presume that physically attractive people possess other desirable qualities
as well. We unconsciously link traits such as kindness, intelligence,
and honesty with beauty.77 This leads to a skew in fact-finding, documented in many contexts. For instance, “[u]nattractive litigants receive higher sentences and lower damage awards in simulated legal
proceedings, while attractive litigants have an advantage.”78
Physical attractiveness is unlikely to be the only source of bias
introduced by hearings, however. Other socially valued attributes
may create a similar halo effect and induce a fact-finder to credit one
76. Another way to characterize the conflict between initial impressions and fair evaluations of witness credibility may be drawn from persuasion theory. In one model of socialinformational processing, known as the “Heuristic-Systematic Model,” people have two
overlapping cognitive systems that can be employed in order to evaluate the credibility of a
message. “Systematic processing” involves a “comprehensive analytic” attempt to “evaluate
the validity of the advocated position by scrutinizing the persuasive information and relating this information to their previous knowledge of the persuasion issue.” Alexander Todorov, Shelly Chaiken & Marlone D. Henderson, The Heuristic-Systematic Model of Social
Information Processing, in THE PERSUASION HANDBOOK: DEVELOPMENTS IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 195, 197 (James Price Dillard & Michael Pfau eds., 2002). When people engage
in “[h]euristic processing,” by contrast, they take a less analytic approach, focusing on easily accessible information that “enables them to use simple decision rules or heuristics” to
decide whether to trust a message. Id. Either cognitive system may be invoked in a particular situation, depending on the context in which a person hears a message. Two such
contextual factors are most relevant here: To the degree that a message is ambiguous (that
is, it neither clearly supports nor clearly contradicts a conclusion) and to the degree that a
source is initially perceived as credible, a person evaluating that message becomes more
likely to rely on heuristic processing. See Chaiken & Maheswaran, supra note 74, at 469.
As a result, the initial credibility judgment is more likely to control the final view of message validity (due to a “trustworthy source = trustworthy message” heuristic), in part due
to a partial substitution of heuristic reasoning for a systematic evaluation of message content, and in part due to a biasing effect of the initial heuristic judgment on the systematic
reasoning process itself. Id. Applied to the context of hearing-based decisionmaking, this
suggests that a decisionmaker who receives a favorable initial impression of a witness’s
credibility due to surface features may subsequently give lowered scrutiny to the coherence
of the witness’s message and may be biased towards a pro-credibility finding to the extent
that the content is actually analyzed.
77. SAUL M. KASSIN & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, THE AMERICAN JURY ON TRIAL:
PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 100 (1988); Marc-André Reinhard & Siegfried L. Sporer,
Content Versus Source Cue Information as a Basis for Credibility Judgments: The Impact of
Task Involvement 41 SOC. PSYCHOL. 93, 95-97 (2010) (demonstrating experimentally that
test subjects find more attractive speakers to be more credible).
78. Deborah L. Rhode, The Injustice of Appearance, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1033, 1038
(2009). Cf. Marc W. Patry, Attractive but Guilty: Deliberation and the Physical Attractiveness Bias, 102 PSYCHOL. REP. 727, 728 (2008) (noting the general effect, but adding the
caveat that defendants who “used their attractiveness in the execution of a crime” may be
punished more harshly than otherwise-similar, less-attractive defendants).
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witness more than another. Indicators of high social status, including
a witness’s race, gender, clothing, level of grooming, occupation, and
style of speech, all increase the likelihood that a fact-finder will view
a witness as credible.79 Although it may be hard to totally conceal social status from a fact-finder—we can expect a judge to learn such
information from the sound of a witness’s voice or even from the information that can be gleaned from a written record80—we still may
be concerned that the primacy effect will amplify the power of such
information in particular settings. Social status may be gleaned from
a written record, but it is unlikely to be the first thing a judge will
encounter. In a hearing, such information may be conveyed long before a witness takes the stand. So, while realizing that we can never
avoid halo effects entirely, we should nevertheless number them as
among the factors that could make hearing-based fact-finding less
accurate than a paper-based process.
The other form of bias that might concern us is the tendency to
favor in-groups over out-groups. “In intergroup contexts people generally behave so as to gain or maintain an advantage for their own
group over other groups in terms of resources, status, prestige, and so
forth.”81 Over time, we develop schema for particular groups, which
color our subsequent interactions with those groups. The ways such
schema may influence fact-finding is as varied as a list of the factors
that constitute our personal identities.
Factors such as race provide noteworthy examples of problematic
in-group bias. In testing designed to probe unconscious associations
between a defendant’s race and his innocence, participants “held implicit associations between Black and Guilty,” and those associations
“predicted judgments of ambiguous evidence as more indicative of
guilt.”82 Note that although this effect might be explained to some
extent by the halo effect—whiteness may be a marker of high status
that induces positive associations for white and black people alike—
the use of implicit association tests shows a more mixed picture, in
which Caucasians generally associate whiteness with positive char-

79. J. Alexander Tanford & Sarah Tanford, Better Trials Through Science: A Defense
of Psychologist-Lawyer Collaboration, 66 N.C. L. REV. 741, 750 (1988); HANS & VIDMAR,
supra note 43, at 140 (noting that “we evaluate a person’s credibility by his or her speech
style” and that styles of speaking are often associated with the sex, social class, or ethnic
background of the speaker); WILLIAM M. O’BARR, LINGUISTIC EVIDENCE: LANGUAGE, POWER, AND STRATEGY IN THE COURTROOM 74 (1982) (finding that mock jurors found the same
testimony more convincing if it was delivered using a “powerful” mode of speaking than if a
“powerless” mode was employed).
80. Andrew E. Taslitz, Confessing in the Human Voice: A Defense of the Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination, 7 CARDOZO PUB. L., POL'Y & ETHICS J. 121, 174, 177, 183-84 (2008).
81. Michael A. Hogg, Intergroup Relations, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 479,
480 (John Delamater ed., 2006).
82. Justin D. Levinson et al., Guilty by Implicit Racial Bias: The Guilty/Not Guilty
Implicit Association Test, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 187, 189-90, 206 (2010).
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acteristics (because the halo effect and the in-group effect reinforce
each other), while black people have more mixed results, with some
individuals associating blackness with badness and others reversing
the association.83
Similar effects might be expected for other traits. Female judges,
for instance, are more likely than male judges to rule in favor of (predominantly female) sex discrimination litigants.84 Likewise, we might
worry that fact-finders will favor those who hold similar social or political views,85 and that a fact-finder might draw inferences about a
witness’s beliefs based on how that witness dresses and behaves.
It is important to qualify the significance of these sources of bias.
Judges may be able to suppress innate impulses towards stereotyping in decisionmaking to varying degrees, at least some of the time.86
We should be wary of placing complete trust in judicial self-control,
however. Judges are as human as the rest of us, and there is evidence suggesting that they will rely unconsciously on inadmissible
information when it is a salient element of a case.87 This is not to say
every decision will be the product of a halo effect or in-group bias;
oftentimes the evidence may be one-sided enough that these effects
cannot exert a significant influence,88 and in other cases, varying
forms of bias may cancel each other out. But to the extent that avoiding a hearing lowers the salience of various markers of a party's or a
witness’s identity, such avoidance might also lower the risk that a
judge’s evaluation of evidence will be skewed by these forms of bias.
One type of situation might require a different analysis than that
offered above. When a judge is already strongly biased against a disputant, it is possible that being visually confronted by that person
might act as a counterweight, inducing empathy that could serve to
mitigate that bias. As an example, imagine that a judge was faced
with deciding whether a man who had repeatedly committed violent
sexual crimes was so dangerous that he should be placed in preventive incarceration even after he has served the entirety of the sen83. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?,
84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1199-1200 (2009); see also HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 43, at
137-38 (noting that in close cases, race can be a factor in decisionmaking, but that the direction of the effect may vary depending on whether the jury members are of the same or of
a different race than the defendant).
84. See Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dangers of Summary Judgment: Gender and
Federal Civil Litigation, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 705, 768-69 (2007). In-group bias is only one
possible explanation for this data, of course. It is also possible that differing life experiences influence men and women to form different estimates of base rates of sexual discrimination and harassment.
85. See Dan M. Kahan, Culture, Cognition, and Consent: Who Perceives What, and
Why, in Acquaintance-Rape Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 729, 793, 800-01, 804-05 (2010).
86. Rachlinski et al., supra note 83, at 1202-04, 1221-26.
87. See Wistrich et al., supra note 70, at 1330-31.
88. See BURNS, supra note 4, at 9 (arguing that “it is the evidence in the case, more
than any other factor, that determines the outcome” of most jury trials).
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tences due to his prior crimes.89 Perhaps, a judge might reason, viewing the potential detainee can only help. After all, the presence of
this person in the flesh might mitigate the bias produced merely by
knowing his record.90
There is an important kernel of truth in this suggestion. In some
cases, a judge may be able to move past initially unjust impressions
of a defendant in part due to the emotional impact of seeing and
hearing the other person in a live encounter.91 But this approach
should be viewed with appropriate caution, at least in cases where
the judge already has a strongly negative view of a party or witness.
First, because of the initially negative impression, a judge might well
end up evaluating ambiguous demeanor cues as more “confirmation”
that the witness should not be trusted; as in the Asch experiment,
first impressions may dominate over subsequent information.92 What
is more, in seeking to move from one strong emotion (antipathy) to a
place of neutrality, by harnessing a countervailing emotion (empathy), we create a real risk. Experiencing empathy towards someone
we have previously disliked is often an unpleasant feeling, and the
cognitive dissonance involved in holding two such opposing states in
the mind is unpleasant, so that people experiencing such states “are
motivated to reduce [the conflict].”93 The urge to return to a nonconflicted mental state may produce some benefits—such as greater
attention to conflicting evidence—but it may also encourage rash or
impulsive decisions.94 As a result, the ambivalent attitudes may “become polarized, resulting in exaggerated positive attitudes if exposed
to positive information about the person, and exaggerated negative

89. See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 354 (1997) (considering due process
issues in connection with the indefinite detention, under the Kansas Sexually Violent
Predator Act, of a person who had engaged in a “chilling history of repeated child sexual
molestation and abuse”).
90. See Kenworthey Bilz, We Don’t Want to Hear It: Psychology, Literature and the
Narrative Model of Judging, 2010 ILL. L. REV. 429, 465-66 (noting that “inducing empathy
. . . predictably inspires an emotional response of sympathy and compassion” and can lead
to a “softening of attitudes toward the wrongdoer”); id. at 467-68 (noting that feelings of
empathy can help reduce “ ‘correspondence bias,’ in which we assume that others’ behaviors are a product of immutable personality traits rather than of their circumstances”).
91. See id. at 465-66; Laurie L. Levenson, Courtroom Demeanor: The Theater of the
Courtroom, 92 MINN. L. REV. 573, 592-94 (2008) (describing high-profile cases in which the
mild or contrite appearance of the defendants may have garnered the sympathy of jurors);
BURNS, supra note 62, at 134-35 (noting that the “aural medium” has a socializing influence, making it harder for a jury to treat the case “simply as a stereotype of a certain kind
of controversy”).
92. See Asch, supra note 73, at 270-72; Levenson, supra note 91, at 594-96 (relating
how, in the trial of Timothy McVeigh, the jury interpreted his “bland[]” clothing and stoic
demeanor as evidence that McVeigh was a “cold, heartless, and calculating killer” who felt
no remorse).
93. See Bilz, supra note 90 at 464 & n.165 (collecting psychological sources on the
motivating effects of cognitive dissonance).
94. See id. at 464-65.
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attitudes when exposed to negative information”—a process that can
also lead to extreme actions toward the subject of the ambivalence.95
Many might regard this possible “solution” to the problem of initial
bias to be worse than the problem it addresses. Given the conflicting
possible results that can arise from the use of demeanor as a debiasing tool, one thing seems clear: The visual and aural presence of disputants and witnesses creates a significant risk of bias based on appearance, social status, and in-group affiliation, and the danger of
these factors is not obviously outweighed by any bias-correcting function when a fact-finder has an initially negative impression of a particular party to the dispute.96
As we have seen, the conventional judicial wisdom fails to provide
a fruitful foundation for a theory of live procedures because it is
premised on a faulty intuition. Neither people in general, nor judges
in particular, are good at catching deception or inaccuracies of memory from demeanor cues, and in fact such cues are more likely to lead
a fact-finder astray than to aid her. Some scholarly critiques have
pointed out this concern, but they have failed to supplement it with a
holistic consideration of the accuracy costs and benefits of live procedures as opposed to a decision on a written record.
Now that we have surveyed some of the concerns at stake in such
a decision, we have seen the following things:
First, live testimony will rarely add value in detecting deception.
When it does help, it will not usually be through useful demeanor
cues. Rather, a witness’s deception may be unearthed through surprises at cross-examination that reveal inconsistencies in the witness’s story. Such surprises are most likely to occur when a witness
has not been well-prepared for the cross-examination. Successful
cross-examination is therefore most likely to occur when a party’s
opportunity to woodshed a witness is limited by either lack of information or financial resources. Once the witness is well-prepared to
testify, however, the primary effect of a hearing on a credibility determination will be to add misleading demeanor evidence into consideration, which will tend to lower the quality of credibility findings.
Second, live testimony may nevertheless increase the accuracy of
decisionmaking by clarifying vague or ambiguous evidence. A judge
may find deposition transcripts and affidavits opaque on the points
95. Id.
96. To be clear, I do not wish to suggest that activating empathy in general provides
no value in the fair resolution of cases. Rather, I am urging only that empathy is unlikely
to help correct an initially negative bias against a party in a way that returns a decisionmaker to a more neutral state of mind. Cf. Jody Lyneé Madeira, Lashing Reason to the
Mast: Understanding Judicial Constraints on Emotion in Personal Injury Litigation, 40
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 137, 142 (2006) (describing the personal injury trial as a forum in which
“[p]ainful sights and sounds” provide “a forum for negotiation between narratives” as parties vie for the empathy of jurors).

2011]

LIVE HEARINGS AND PAPER TRIALS

851

where she needs clarity in order to reach a decision, and the opportunity to ask follow-up questions of a witness at a hearing may be a
useful way to resolve these questions. Likewise, in very complex cases, a live hearing may provide a party with an opportunity to explain
complex scientific or economic evidence to a greater extent than a
paper briefing would allow.
Third, the presence of a witness in court may induce or worsen
certain forms of decisional bias. Specifically, live procedures may emphasize cues as to the attractiveness, race, and social status of a witness
that will encourage a fact-finder to affiliate with some witnesses and
distrust others on the basis of factors that bear little relation to accuracy.
Thus, to the degree that a judge has not already had the opportunity
to form a personal impression of the parties or witnesses, a decision
on a written record may be shielded from certain forms of bias.
So, in short, the benefits of live testimony are most likely to accrue
when the witnesses are not prepared for cross-examination or when
the evidentiary record is either vague or technically complex. Live
procedures will have significant accuracy costs, however, when the
dispute centers on the credibility of well-prepared witnesses or when
a live hearing or trial will allow a judge to form first impressions of
witnesses based on their appearances.
IV. SUBJECTIVE FAIRNESS: MAKING PAPER-FOCUSED
LITIGATION PALATABLE
Although the accuracy concerns described above are central to any
consideration of the utility of live hearings and trials, they do not tell
the whole story. A theory that attends heavily to how accurate legal
decisions are, but pays no attention to how acceptable those procedures are to the litigants and the public, ignores the fact that the law
requires public acceptance and cooperation if it is to meaningfully
guide the conduct of the citizens it governs.97 A useful label for these
concerns is “subjective fairness.” Unlike the accuracy concerns described above, which relate to the ability of judicial decisions to accurately describe historical events98 and can therefore be said to involve
a fairness that is separate from the preferences of either party, subjective fairness focuses on “whether disputants and neutral observers
believe that procedures and outcomes are fair, rather than whether
the procedures or outcomes were fair in some objective sense.”99

97. See Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1359 (1985).
98. Cf. GOLDMAN, supra note 25, at 59-68 (defending the notion that a statement is
true if it successfully describes events in the world).
99. E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 26 (1988).
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As we shall see, the decision to resolve legal disputes without a live
hearing may come at a cost from the standpoint of subjective fairness,
even if (as discussed above) dispensing with hearings would make the
resulting outcomes more accurate. Subjective fairness, in other
words, does not always correspond with objective fairness. Nevertheless, in those cases where there are significant accuracy gains available from using a paper trial decision procedure, the subjective fairness
costs of such a procedure often can be minimized to the point where they
will be outweighed by the procedure’s objective accuracy advantages.
At the outset, there is a potential objection to this line of inquiry
that is worth addressing. One type of reader, when informed that
procedures may involve a trade-off between objective accuracy and
subjective experiences of fairness, may feel that there is no trade-off
at all. After all, such a reader would say, the goal of legal procedures
is to “get it right,” and we should not sacrifice that goal in the pursuit
of making litigants “feel” better.100 Indeed, it might even seem to represent a form of disrespect to give litigants a “dumbed down” form of
justice that feels satisfying, but is in fact less reliable. In this framing, procedures that have high ratings of subjective fairness but lower levels of objective accuracy are like junk food: a satisfying experience, but nonetheless bad for the people who enjoy it.
There are several reasons why this objection is less weighty than
it might seem. One response is to fall back on democratic assumptions; if people, by and large, prefer certain types of legal procedures,
perhaps that provides enough of a reason to make such procedures
accessible.101 Under such a theory, taking the preferences of the public into account when designing litigation procedures can be justified
on the grounds that to do otherwise would be paternalistic. Just as
we allow people to eat candy bars even if they may suffer bad consequences from doing so, we should not presume to choose in their
stead that they should prefer one type of litigation procedure over
another.102 Unfortunately, this response can only take us so far. Although it might seem relevant when people have the choice between
a number of different procedures for dispute resolution—as in, for
example, the arbitration context—the legal system acts both as a “default rule” for situations where no private choices have been made

100. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Making Effective Rules: The Need for Procedure Theory,
61 OKLA. L. REV. 319, 338 (2008) (expressing skepticism that the demands of participatory
rights can ever rise above the needs of adjudicative accuracy).
101. Tom R. Tyler, Citizen Discontent with Legal Procedures: A Social Science Perspective
on Civil Procedure Reform, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 871, 871-72 (1997); Austin Sarat, Studying
American Legal Culture: An Assessment of Survey Evidence, 11 L. & SOC’Y REV. 427, 430 (1977).
102. See Tyler, supra note 101, at 871-72.
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and as a backstop when those other options have broken down.103 To
continue the analogy, it is one thing to say that people should be free
to buy candy bars if they want them, but another to make candy bars
the only option provided to poor children who depend on school lunch
programs. The first option respects private choice, while the second
imposes what may be an unhealthy choice on a population of people
who are ill-suited to judge between different options for themselves
and who may be unable to select another option in any event.104
In the end, the value of respecting individual preferences for particular types of procedures might be overcome if we had reason to
think that those preferences placed individuals in danger of significant harm. As one author has noted, the powerful effects of perceived
procedural fairness can put “[s]cience . . . at the service of authority,”
helping to “mobiliz[e] consent” to official action.105 The danger then
arises that authorities will abuse this information to “construct[] procedures that give people the opportunity to be heard while, at the
same time, systematically denying them just outcomes.”106 In the procedural justice literature, this concern is often described as the problem of “false consciousness”: “If people are satisfied with objectively
poor outcomes because they believe they were generated by a fair
process, this may reflect a false consciousness that is not desirable.”107
In a condition of false consciousness, citizens may be satisfied

103. See Solum, supra note 25, at 261 (noting that litigants are often unable to freely
choose the procedures that will apply to their cases and may indeed be forced to play according to a particular set of rules or suffer a default judgment).
104. The candy analogy can, of course, be taken too far. It might justly be said that to
compare the preference of citizens for procedures that allow them to voice their grievances
to a preference for junk food is to minimize very real expressive and moral values that are
at stake in such a setting. This concern becomes especially compelling when we recall that
the public generally places relatively little confidence in legal authorities, including courts,
which suggests that legal institutions may be failing to provide the public with the type of
justice it desires. See Tyler, supra note 101, at 872. Moreover, it may be inappropriate (depending on one’s ethical assumptions) to describe the desire to participate in legal proceedings and to be treated with dignity by public officials as a “mere” preference, like the desire
for sugary foods. Some commentators insist vigorously that procedural preferences of this
type have deep moral foundations. See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler & E. Allan Lind, Procedural Justice, in HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE RESEARCH IN LAW 65, 67 (Joseph Sanders & V. Lee Hamilton eds., 2001) (“People’s attitudes are . . . important in their own right, because a central
tenet of democratic government is that . . . people should be able to accept the solutions
reached by those in power.”); JERRY L. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE
STATE 45-49, 162-63 (1985) (tracing the source of our constitutional right to be heard by a
decisionmaker to our moral right, as autonomous beings, to be treated as ends rather than
as a means to someone else’s ends, and urging that connecting procedural rights to such
dignitary values has an “intuitive plausibility”).
105. Austin Sarat, Authority, Anxiety, and Procedural Justice: Moving from Scientific
Detachment to Critical Engagement, 27 L. & SOC’Y REV. 647, 656 (1993) (book review).
106. Id. at 658-59.
107. TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 111 (2006).
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when they should not be, relying on a system’s perceived neutrality
but ignoring its tendency to produce unfair outcomes.108
Despite this concern, the harm resulting from employing objectively accurate procedures that feel substantially unfair may sometimes be great enough to justify sacrificing small amounts of accuracy
for large gains in public acceptance. To see why, we must look at the
system from a large-scale perspective and consider the role of individual case outcomes in accounting for compliance with legal rules.109
From this perspective, individual civil cases send a “behavioral message” through which society attempts to “influence individuals’ conduct” by “forg[ing] a link between . . . wrong and liability.”110
When we focus on deterrence, the role of subjective assessments of
fairness takes on a great deal of importance. In a classic study, Tyler
surveyed a large number of Chicago residents both before and after
their encounters with law enforcement and the courts. In analyzing
the responses to his surveys, he found that those citizens who viewed
legal procedures as fair were more likely to have a positive view of
legal authorities and the legitimacy of the legal system.111 Having a
favorable view of legal authorities and the legitimacy of the judicial
system, in turn, made the individuals more likely to comply with the
commands of the law.112 One implication of this finding is that even if
legal procedures are very accurate, the willingness of people to obey
the law may decline if those people view those procedures as unfair.113 The significance of this effect is not overwhelming—many other factors bear on legal compliance, so a modest increase in subjective
dissatisfaction will not immediately lead to a strong upswell in lawbreaking114—but it is still a factor that should be considered before
108. Sarat, supra note 105, at 659, 662; TYLER, supra note 107, at 147; see also Robert
J. MacCoun, Voice, Control and Belonging: The Double-Edged Sword of Procedural Fairness, 1 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 171, 193 (2005).
109. See Tyler & Lind, supra note 104, at 66 (“[F]or the law to be effective, people must
obey it.”).
110. Nesson, supra note 97, at 1359.
111. See TYLER, supra note 107, at 63; Tyler & Lind, supra note 104, at 80.
112. TYLER, supra note 107, at 62-64. The effect on legal compliance can take several
different forms. First, dissatisfied litigants may be less likely to obey specific judicial orders, such as the obligation to follow probation conditions, satisfy a judgment debt, or pay
child support. To the extent that litigants experience procedures as unfair, compliance with
such orders is likely to decrease. See Tyler, supra note 101, at 872-74. This problem becomes particularly worrisome when we confront the reality that sanctions alone are often
insufficient to compel compliance with judicial orders. See id. at 873. Second, a negative
view of the legal system’s legitimacy may lead as well to a lowered willingness to comply
with the law when it clashes with individual preferences or moral beliefs; in other words,
lowered views of systemic legitimacy may undermine the law’s ability to produce general
deterrence of illegal activity. See id. at 873-74.
113. See Tyler & Lind, supra note 104, at 80.
114. See id. at 80-81; TYLER, supra note 107, at 59-60 (finding, in a regression analysis
of survey data from numerous Chicago residents, that compliance with the law correlated
most strongly with views that the law’s commands were morally just, that the legitimacy of
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we decide to ignore public reactions to changes in judicial procedures
solely on the ground that the new procedures are more accurate. In
the end, it seems inappropriate to ignore either concept of fairness.
Increasing subjective satisfaction through procedural changes that
cause large decreases in accuracy would seem subject to the false
consciousness objection, but modest increases in accuracy that come
at the cost of large decreases in perceptions of fairness may harm the
cause of deterrence more than they help it.
This brings us to the central question of this section: Will individuals respond more favorably to procedures that employ live testimony than those who rely only on briefing and record evidence? If so,
decisionmakers who must decide between the two procedures might
sometimes be faced with a hard choice, at least in cases where presence is a hindrance to good fact-finding rather than an aid. They
might choose to dispense with live testimony, gaining more accuracy
in fact-finding at the cost of making the litigants unhappy and possibly worsening their view of the legitimacy of law. Or alternatively,
they might hold a hearing or live trial in order to keep the litigants
happy and thereby lose some measure of confidence in the accuracy
of the final result.
This is not an idle concern. Although this precise question has not
been studied, people who respond to surveys regarding their views of
what make procedures fair often express preferences that would illaccord with a widespread adoption of hearing-less decision procedures.115 One such preference—a litigant’s desire to control the manner in which her case is made to a court—deserves sustained attention in this context.116
It is fairly clear that litigants value what has been called “process
control”—meaning “control over the opportunity to state one’s case”
to a decisionmaker.117 People value process control for a number of
legal authorities played a modest but measurable role in compliance, and that deterrence
and peer opinion played a smaller but still significant role).
115. See generally TYLER, supra note 107, at 137-38.
116. Other factors that are often enumerated are the degree to which people perceive
decisionmakers to be “unbiased, honest, and principled,” the degree to which decisionmakers seem “benevolent and caring,” and the degree to which decisionmakers treat disputants
with “dignity and respect.” Michael M. O’Hear, Plea Bargaining and Procedural Justice, 42
GA. L. REV. 407, 421 (2008) (adding these three factors to the case-control and expressive
concerns described above). It seems doubtful that the decision to employ a paper trial
would significantly affect the neutrality interest in having an unbiased decisionmaker,
given that it treats all parties in a similar manner. Likewise, to the extent that the reasons
for employing a non-hearing procedure are explained to litigants and the court and then
explains the reasons for its decision in a way that shows that it has considered the parties’
arguments, it is unlikely that the interests in having a decisionmaker seem to care about
your rights or respect your dignity will be greatly affected. See id. at 429 (“Perceived trustworthiness is enhanced when the authorities demonstrate that they have actually considered the information offered during voice opportunities.”).
117. TYLER, supra note 107, at 115.
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reasons. Some of its value is as a means to an end; parties want to
control the evidence and arguments presented to a court so that they
can make sure that a persuasive case is made and thereby maximize
their chances of winning.118 The decision to hold live hearings or not
should have little impact on this value in most cases because the attorney, regardless of the extent to which the client values process
control, is ethically obliged to consult with his client regarding the
means by which the client’s litigation objectives are to be pursued.119
There may, no doubt, be situations in which the client’s control over
the strategic or tactical litigation choices will be impaired in the absence of live proceedings. If a client lacks the means to monitor his
attorney’s conduct by perusing the lawyer’s written submissions—
perhaps due to a lack of legal sophistication—the observation of the
lawyer’s performance at a live hearing might be the best available indicator of the quality of the lawyer’s efforts on his behalf. There may,
indeed, be cases where this value becomes paramount, due to the
combination of a particularly unsophisticated client and a lawyer
whose poor performance calls out for client monitoring. But unless
the hearing in question would occur early in a case, it may be too late
for the process to add much value in terms of the client’s ability to
control the content of the case presented by his lawyers. So overall,
this instrumental value of process control will not be greatly affected
by the decision to hear live testimony at the trial stage.
The instrumental value of process control does not tell the whole
story, however; litigants derive significant value from expressing
themselves to a decisionmaker even in the absence of a clear connection between such expression and a plausible change in the case’s
outcome.120 Although this fact might seem surprising, it has been
documented in a number of studies that giving litigants opportunities
to control the presentation of their case matters even when the decisionmaker openly gives very little weight to the litigants’ arguments.121 Indeed, this effect can persist even when the decisionmaker
announces that the litigants’ views will have no effect on the decision. In one experiment, conducted by Lind, a task-assigner “announced his decision” regarding the workload of participants, making
it clear that the decision “was final and not subject to change,” and

118. See John Thibaut & Laurens Walker, A Theory of Procedure, 66 CAL. L. REV. 541,
550-52, 556 (1978) (urging that, because procedural control gives parties the ability to introduce “possibly important contextual factors” that a neutral investigator would overlook,
it will maximize the chances that the result will be an “attainment of distributive justice”
between the parties).
119. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2003).
120. See TYLER, supra note 107, at 116.
121. See, e.g., id. at 133; MacCoun, supra note 108, at 192 (describing the study reported in E. Allan Lind et al., Voice, Control, and Procedural Justice: Instrumental and
Noninstrumental Concerns in Fairness Judgments, 59 J. Pers. & Soc. Psych. 952 (1990)).
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then invited some of them to offer comments anyway.122 The participants who were permitted to offer comments rated the procedures as
significantly fairer than did those participants who were not provided
with such an opportunity.123
This non-instrumental process control value—what we might call
the value of self-expression in procedure—seems more likely to be
infringed by paper-based procedures. The risk is that judges who decide cases without holding evidentiary hearings may seem like bureaucratic black boxes because the process of considering and weighing evidence is hidden from the parties. Parties may therefore feel as
if they have not been able to express their point of view to the judge,
which in turn will lead to a decline in assessments of procedural fairness. What is worse, this problem may be magnified in the very cases
in which hearings are most likely to be objectively unfair. As discussed above,124 hearings pose a particular risk to the accuracy of
judgments when the dispute centers around the credibility of the disputants, due to the misleading effects of demeanor evidence and the
biasing effects of party appearance and behavior. But, at least on an
intuitive level, it is in these cases—cases in which the decision must
necessarily discredit the honesty or accuracy of one party’s story—
that the denial of an opportunity to address the decisionmaker is
most likely to feel fundamentally unfair to the parties. And this problem may be exacerbated by the fact that the flaws that a non-hearing
procedure is attempting to avoid—that is, our cognitive limits in assessing the likelihood of deception when demeanor is in play—cut
against the grain of our everyday intuition that we can tell when
someone is lying to us.125
For several reasons, however, the disadvantages of paper procedures for litigants’ perceptions of subjective fairness are less serious
than they might initially seem. First, it is not the case that every
choice between live and paper procedures involves a potential loss of
expressive opportunity for a party. Some pretrial hearings, for instance, will turn on questions of fact that do not implicate the parties’
own knowledge or involve questions of law to which testimony will
not be relevant. A classic example of this would be a Daubert motion,
in which the only question for a court is whether an expert witness
should be allowed to testify at a trial on the merits.126 Although the
122. MacCoun, supra note 108, at 192 (describing the study reported in E. ALLAN LIND,
ARBITRATING HIGH-STAKES CASES: AN EVALUATION OF COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION IN A
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT (RAND 1990)).
123. Id. at 192-93.
124. See supra Part II.
125. See Sporer & Schwandt, supra note 42, at 24-27 (noting that certain behaviors
commonly associated with deception are not correlated to untruthfulness).
126. See FED. R. EVID. 702; Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical, Inc., 509 U.S. 579,
585 (1993).
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court will need to resolve issues of fact in such a setting, the parties’
testimony will not be needed. And although the potential expert witness
might wish to have some expressive input before a court makes its
decision, a court might justly decide that the subjective preferences of
a paid professional witness weigh less heavily than the need to accurately determine the admissibility question. So if the court thought
that a paper-based procedure was superior in such a setting, subjective fairness concerns would be unlikely to suggest a different result.127
Parties with an attenuated personal connection to their disputes
may likewise experience little loss of satisfaction when courts employ
paper-based fact-finding procedures. Perhaps the simplest way in
which such a situation would arise would be when one party’s connection to its claim is purely financial. Consider, for instance, an insurer bringing a subrogated claim on behalf of its insured. For one
thing, the insurer is itself an artificial legal entity that cannot personally experience anything we would recognize as satisfaction or
dissatisfaction with procedures. For another, its owners and agents—
who are capable of feeling such feelings—can be expected to have a
less intense connection with a disputed matter, given that such disputes are a routine part of their day-to-day work and that decisions
about such disputes will not reflect on their past conduct or blamefulness. To be sure, the owners and agents of business associations
will sometimes feel very strongly about the subjects of their companies’ lawsuits,128 but we can expect a significant volume of “mundane”
litigation arising out of business transactions in which some of the
parties may view the process as a chore rather than an opportunity
for expression.
Finally, it is worth noting that in many cases, a paper trial procedure will in fact be satisfaction-enhancing because it will take the
place of a settlement process rather than a more expressive live hearing or trial. As will be discussed in more detail below, paper-based
procedures may save significant litigation costs for parties.129 In some
cases, this cost-reduction may encourage the parties to seek a judicial
determination of the merits of their dispute rather than settle their
case.130 The arbitration context provides a useful example of such a
process, in that the lowered costs of arbitration make it more likely
127. Note, however, that the clarity-enhancing virtues of live testimony might still counsel
in favor of a live Daubert hearing, at least if the testimony in question is fairly complex.
128. Cf. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 907 (2010) (noting
that most corporations are relatively small and not particularly wealthy). One can imagine,
for instance, that the owner of a small business could take being sued by a regular customer quite personally.
129. See infra Part IV.
130. See E. ALLAN LIND, ARBITRATING HIGH-STAKES CASES: AN EVALUATION OF COURTANNEXED ARBITRATION IN A UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 63 (RAND 1990) (noting that
the lowered costs of arbitration hearings have this effect).
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that parties will press their claims in such a forum than they would if
they could only obtain relief in court.131 Arbitrating parties, on average, experience greater process satisfaction than those whose cases
are confined to the court system,132 and this may stem, in part, from
the fact that arbitration “gives litigants something that they want . . .
an opportunity to have their cases adjudicated.”133 In other words,
most parties probably prefer to get a chance to make their complaints
in an authoritative forum, and they will lose such an opportunity if
pushed to settle their cases due to the high cost of litigating. To the
extent that non-hearing procedures can realize a similar cost reduction as arbitration, we might expect a similar gain in overall satisfaction, especially if the process is designed in a transparent way.
Having said this, there are no doubt many potential hearings or
trials in which parties have a strong emotional tie with the dispute,
in which a live hearing will be less expensive than a paper-based procedure, and in which the parties can be expected to offer evidence.
In such cases, litigants might experience a significant loss of expressive opportunity and therefore view the overall process as less fair.
The question, then, is whether paper-based fact-finding will feel so
unfair in such cases that we should reject it even when it has strong
accuracy advantages.
Happily, a well-designed paper procedure will probably allow
enough litigant participation that any loss of satisfaction will be minimal. For one thing, the “bureaucratic black box” characterization of
the paper trial process depends on the assumption that the nonhearing process, and the reasons for it, are not transparent to litigants. But if the court explains the reasons for using a paper-based
procedure, casting the overall goal as one of fairness and the avoidance
of bias, the likelihood that the parties will lose confidence in the fairness
of the overall process should be reduced.134 Indeed, so long as procedures involve a certain baseline level of party control and participation, smaller levels of participation variation seem to have little or no
effect on satisfaction rates.135 Moreover, the parties’ perceptions that
131. Id.
132. Id. at 44-45.
133. Id. at 63; see also O’Hear, supra note 116, at 425 (noting that parties value voice
even when they are engaging in a process of negotiation in which they have strong decisional control).
134. See Bone, supra note 100, at 339 (noting that litigants already accept some loss of
voice due to existing non-party preclusion rules and that giving “reasons” for such preclusion may affect their willingness to regard such rules as legitimate).
135. See E. ALLAN LIND ET AL., THE PERCEPTION OF JUSTICE: TORT LITIGANTS’ VIEWS OF
TRIAL, COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION, AND JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCES 62 (1989).
Lind specifically examined three types of dispute resolution procedures—judicial trials,
arbitrations, and judicially mediated settlement conferences—and found that within this
subset of procedures, variations in felt participation did not correlate significantly with
satisfaction levels. Id. When compared with Tyler’s much broader survey of public experi-
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the court will hear and consider their arguments may be increased by
an explanation of how the court has reached its decision, with an emphasis on its consideration of all the evidence that the parties have
submitted. Such an explanation might reassure parties that their
arguments are still attended to even if they have not been heard.
Finally, if we are still concerned that litigants will find a paper
procedure unfair, it may help to provide them with additional expressive opportunities that will give them a sense of having been heard
without affecting the outcome. Taking inspiration from Lind’s workload-assignment study, a court might allow the parties to personally
summarize their cases in open court at the time it announces its decision.136 Although this procedure will likely be viewed less favorably
by the parties than one in which it is clear that their arguments can
impact the outcome of the case,137 it might still reduce their discomfort with an accuracy-enhancing procedure to an acceptable level.
In summary, although significant legitimacy issues are at stake
when we choose between live and paper-based fact-finding procedures, it seems unlikely that there will be a significant loss in litigant
satisfaction from employing paper-based methods. Indeed, when
choosing between live and paper-based trials, the paper procedure
may enhance litigant satisfaction if it can lower costs enough that
parties who would otherwise have settled will instead obtain a judicial decision on the merits of their cases. But even in settings where
the cost difference may not have this effect,138 such as early pretrial
fact-finding, any deficiencies of a paper procedure might be reduced
to acceptable levels by providing litigants outlets for personal expression short of a full hearing, by explaining the reasons for the procedure in understandable terms, and by making it clear that the reasons for eschewing live presentation are grounded in the desire for
accuracy rather than in judicial disinterest. In short, when paperbased procedures are more accurate than the live alternative, they
can probably be made to feel fair enough to be acceptable to litigants.
V. OTHER PRAGMATIC CONSIDERATIONS: COST, DELAY, AND
AGENCY CONCERNS
In assessing the value of hearings, cost is a variable that we cannot ignore.139 Relying on values such as accuracy and subjective fairences with police and courts, this suggests that variations in expressive input matter less
within a relatively high-participation and high-formality subset of dispute resolution procedures than among the much broader range of dispute resolution possibilities.
136. See MacCoun, supra note 108, at 192-93; Lind et al., supra note 121, at 956.
137. See Lind et al., supra note 121, at 956.
138. See discussion infra Part IV.
139. See also MARILYN J. BERGER ET AL., PRETRIAL ADVOCACY 2 (1988) (warning lawyers that their advocacy will always be constrained by their client’s cost concerns).
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ness alone, we would develop a warped theory. This is easiest to see
in the simple example of a case in which the “outcome . . . includes a
damage award that reflects an accurate application of the substantive law to the facts,” but the “plaintiff who was entitled to prevail
had to pay more in attorneys’ fees than the value of the judgment.”140
Nor is cost only relevant in such extreme circumstances. High litigation costs for defendants (even if less than the amount in controversy) can incentivize strike suits even when those defendants are
innocent of wrongdoing.141 And higher litigation costs generally encourage parties to settle claims rather than pursue them to trial; if
we are concerned about the lack of authoritative adjudications of
claims (perhaps due to the potential stagnation of the law or the secrecy of resulting settlement amounts), then this is an additional
downside of high costs.142 Moreover, the effect of litigation costs on
settlement decisions produces a secondary cost. As discussed above,
parties who are pushed towards settlement are likely to feel deprived
of an opportunity to present their case to a decisionmaker and to
view the overall procedure as less legitimate.143 Finally, absent any
other effects, any unnecessary costs—that is, any costs not offset by
an increase in accuracy or subjective satisfaction with the litigation
process—are simply a deadweight loss.144
The balance between fairness considerations and litigation costs
cannot be formulated in simple mathematical terms, however. The
problem is that most of the key variables are subject to significant
uncertainty. As we have already seen, the use of hearings in a decisionmaking process is not likely to consistently improve accuracy or
reduce it; rather, the impact will depend on a number of case-specific
factors, including the degree to which the dispute hinges upon credibility, the degree to which the parties or witnesses on one side of the
dispute may gain an advantage due to biasing appearance factors,
the amount of preparation that has occurred before the hearing, and
the amount of confusion inherent in the existing record.145 The problem is exacerbated because we lack existing data on the degree of bias that hearings may induce, or the amount of clarity they may provide, either in general or in the relevant subsets of case-types. So although we can easily articulate a goal—that we would like to balance
the benefits of hearing procedures against their costs—we can do so
only in a general way, without being able to do any explicit balancing.

140. Solum, supra note 25, at 185.
141. Cf. Paul Stancil, Balancing the Pleading Equation, 61 BAYLOR L. REV. 90, 148 (2009).
142. See BURNS, supra note 4, at 112-35; Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE
L.J. 1073, 1085-87 (1984).
143. See LIND, supra note 130, at 44-45, 63; see also discussion supra Part III.
144. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 549 (4th ed. 1992).
145. See discussion supra Parts II, III.
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The foregoing also assumes something that is far from clear: that
holding a hearing necessarily makes litigation more expensive. To
some extent, such an assumption is implicit in the many legal rules
that allow judges to dispense with live procedures when deciding issues that are legally frivolous.146 Hearings and trials, in this framing,
should be dispensed with in easy cases but used in hard ones. Those
who rely on this framing seem to assume two things. The first assumption is that live procedures will either improve, or have at worst
have no effect on, the accuracy of a resulting decision; we therefore
are obliged to use them whenever the outcome of a case is in doubt.
The second assumption is that live procedures are more expensive
than alternative decisionmaking methods; we therefore should dispense with them in cases whose outcome is clear. As we have seen,
the first assumption is flawed because live testimony may reduce the
accuracy of decisions where a case is close due to a difficult credibility
contest. The second assumption is likewise flawed. Live procedures
will sometimes add costs to decisionmaking, but will at other times
be less expensive than paper-based fact-finding.
A. The Court’s Perspective
First, we must consider the ways in which a decision between a
live and a paper-based procedure impacts a court. A judge, as well as
other court employees, must take time away from other business in
order to sit and hear evidence. The relevant unit of expense, for our
purposes, is time. Most court staff, including judges, are salaried personnel who must allocate a limited budget of time between a number
of competing cases. Nor is the concern merely for the worksatisfaction of government employees; a backlog of court-time can
result in a lengthy queue for case consideration. Such queues, in
turn, give rise to social distress. Litigants who must wait many
months or years for a decision may become embittered or be hindered
in their ability to plan their future conduct due to lingering uncertainty, and members of the general public may lose respect for a judicial
system that imposes lengthy delays between questions and answers.147
In some circumstances, a judge can save court time by holding a
live hearing or trial. One such situation would occur when the evi146. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 56; Rules Governing Section 2254 and 2255 Cases in the
United States District Courts 4 (2010).
147. See Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 102, 104 Stat. 5089
(“The courts, the litigants, the litigants' attorneys, and the Congress and the executive
branch, share responsibility for cost and delay in civil litigation and its impact on access to
the courts, adjudication of cases on the merits, and the ability of the civil justice system to
provide proper and timely judicial relief for aggrieved parties.”). But see LIND ET AL., supra
note 135, at 54-55, 77-78 (noting that, when litigants have access to relatively formal
methods of dispute resolution subject to “moderate levels of delay,” their satisfaction was
affected by their perceptions of delay, but did not vary based on the actual duration of their cases).
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dence in the record is confusing or ambiguous. Imagine that a key
witness has been vague on an important point in his affidavit or deposition testimony. Rather than slowly puzzle through the record,
comparing this problematic testimony with other, possibly conflicting
evidence, a judge might chose to hear live testimony instead. By doing so, she can ensure that the witness will be pinned down on the
presently vague point, either through cross-examination or, if necessary, by the judge’s own questions.148 Similarly, a court may be able
to economize by holding a live hearing when a record is complete but
still very complex or hard to follow. Imagine, for instance, a case in
which the key evidence is scattered through numerous documents
and depositions, and in which the parties’ briefing has failed to give a
coherent guide through the maze.149 By requesting a hearing, a judge
may force advocates to winnow down a scattershot presentation into
a smaller number of key arguments.150 And even if the advocates
themselves are unable or unwilling to offer a coherent presentation
at a hearing, a judge can use focused questioning to pin down a recalcitrant attorney, forcing them to either make their claims clear or
risk waiver.151
In practice, these cost savings will interact with the accuracy advantages of hearings discussed earlier. To the extent that a judge is
dealing with a confusing record, a decision on a paper record may involve a choice between accuracy and cost: A careful parsing of the
record may reveal all the information that would be sought in a hearing but only at the cost of a large expenditure of court time. Likewise,
the cost-savings described above can be avoided by making a decision
following a relatively brief review of the written submissions, forcing
the parties to bear the accuracy costs of vague or confusing filings.
The advantage of hearings in such a circumstance, strictly speaking,
is not that they necessarily either save costs or reduce error rates,
but rather that they avoid a trade-off between these two quantities.
Likewise, this analysis is subject to the caveat that some judges may
be able to economize when deciding a case on a paper record by rely148. See FED. R. EVID. 614.
149. See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 513 F. Supp. 1100,
1117-18 (E.D. Penn. 1981), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983),
rev’d, 475 U.S. 574 (1986) (describing the “veritable odyssey,” lasting twenty-three months,
that the district court endured while reviewing an enormous summary judgment record in an antitrust case).
150. See LUBET, supra note 69, at 347 (advising attorneys to “do everything they can to
shorten” their opening statements during a bench trial, eschewing repetition in favor of
giving “a clear picture of the occurrences” in the case); FEDERAL PRACTICE MANUAL FOR
LEGAL AID ATTORNEYS, supra note 66, at 148 (advising advocates that their oral presentations should be brief and should not assume that the judge has comprehended all the material in the briefings).
151. This strategy is not, however, without its own dangers. Past a certain point, simplification might leave out crucial details. A court, therefore, should be more reluctant to
pursue this strategy if the case seems complex despite, and not because of, the written advocacy.
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ing more on the work of law clerks; hearing live testimony, by contrast, cannot be effectively delegated. But to the extent that the judge
will ultimately wish (or need) to carefully consider the relevant evidence personally, live testimony may be the more efficient solution in
cases involving either highly complex information or underperforming advocates.
By contrast, in many cases these benefits will not be present.
Many simple civil cases involve a relatively clear dispute that can
easily be gleaned from a paper record. Imagine, for example, a carcrash case in which the dispute centers on conflicting testimony
about whether a motorist signaled before entering a lane. If the parties and witnesses have been effectively deposed, a hearing may
merely repeat information that can easily be gleaned from a few
short deposition excerpts.
Add to this a factor not previously addressed: Not all live factfinding procedures involve the same degree of requisite formality. For
instance, although bench trials will generally be more streamlined
than a full jury trial, they will often be more complex than a run-ofthe-mill pretrial hearing, incorporating opening statements, casepresentations by each participating party, and possibly final argument.152 So the cost-variable depends, in part, on what law, tradition,
and the participants will find to be an acceptable live procedure. In
the car-crash example, this variable means that a judge offered the
chance to choose between a paper trial and a bench-trial may find
that the added formality of a “trial” counts against it when the expense of the two modes of proceeding are at issue.
So, from a court’s perspective, the cost equation boils down to answering the following questions: First, how long will a hearing take—
can it be a short, simple affair, or will a lengthy process be necessary?
Second, how hard will it be to decide a case on a paper record—is the
briefing easy to follow and the evidence clear, or complex and hardto-follow? Finally, will the hearing make it possible to cut through
ambiguous factual disputes with focused questions, or pin down advocates on disputed facts?153
152. LUBET, supra note 69 at 346-47 (Bench trials sometimes, but not always, include
opening statements and final arguments, although judges tend to prefer that such presentations be shorter in the absence of a jury.).
153. The perspective of a rulemaker is not discussed in detail in this section, but a few
points may usefully be added. First, rulemakers will often be concerned with minimizing
costs to both courts and parties. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (instructing courts to interpret
the federal rules of civil procedure to “secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding”). Beyond a direct concern about costs, rulemakers may
also have preferences regarding the frequency with which cases should be resolved via
settlement or via judicial decision. Compare, e.g., Fiss, supra note 142, at 1085-87, with
FED. R. CIV. P. 16(a) (permitting courts to order pretrial conferences for several purposes,
one of which is “facilitating settlement”). To the extent that one type of decision procedure
has a higher cost to parties than another, parties may be given an extra incentive to settle
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B. The Litigant’s and Witness’s Perspective
The court is not the only relevant actor, however. We must also
assess the impact of live procedures on the parties and witnesses.
The witness perspective is perhaps the easiest to inhabit. Courts
rarely travel to hold hearings, but lawyers often travel to conduct
depositions, so a live hearing or trial will often involve the time and
expense of traveling to court in order to testify. Likewise, lawyers
may often feel the need to prepare witnesses more intensely for crossexamination in court than for a deposition, so a witness may find the
deposition-preparation more congenial.154 And of course, if the question is whether to hold a live trial after a witness has already been
thoroughly deposed, the cost equation for the witness is clear: Paper
procedures are preferable to a second round of testimony.
To some extent, the witness’s concerns might be partially mollified
by a modification of hearing procedures, rather than by an elimination of hearings. If a hearing can be conducted telephonically, for instance, the travel burden for a witness might be reduced.155 In the
end, however, such adjustments cannot make hearings a favorable
bargain for witnesses in most cases. Courts may often be reluctant to
modify the formal presentation of a bench trial to allow for telephonic
testimony, and even if they are not, the desire of attorneys to prepare
witnesses to testify directly to a court may involve preparation burdens that make even telephonic testimony a bad bargain. So, from
the perspective of a non-party witness, a paper procedure will normally be preferable to a hearing.156
For parties, the answer is less obvious. If the parties are financing
their own lawsuits (rather than via a contingent fee arrangement or
an insurance agreement), one obvious interest is in limiting the extent of attorney’s fees.157 Paper procedures have some advantages in
their claims in order to avoid the higher-cost procedure. So if rulemakers generally wish to
incentivize settlements, this may be viewed as a silver-lining to the higher-cost procedure.
154. It is possible that the amount of deposition preparation would increase if the lawyer knew beforehand that the deposition transcript was to be used in a paper trial; some of
the preparation costs, in other words, might shift in response to a rise in the willingness of
courts to use paper trials. Nevertheless, this increase might be modest; parties already
develop depositions with an eye towards either making or defending against a summary
judgment motion, which gives an already large incentive to extract as much evidence as
possible in the time allotted.
155. See FED. R. CIV. P. 43(a) (permitting the court, “[f]or good cause in compelling
circumstances and with appropriate safeguards,” to “permit testimony in open court by
contemporaneous transmission from a different location”).
156. If the witness is testifying as an expert, however, the costs will be shifted to the
party paying the expert witness fees. See THOMAS A. MAUET, PRETRIAL 357 (5th ed. 2002)
(noting that these costs “can be substantial since medical and other technical experts usually command hourly rates comparable to that of lawyers” and that such expenses are further exacerbated if the expert witness needs to be flown in).
157. See id. (noting a five-day case, requiring five days of preparation time, can easily
cost $10,000 in attorney’s fees alone, exclusive of other costs).
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this regard. Lawyers working in firms may be willing to delegate the
taking of depositions to younger associates, but they are likely to be
reluctant to delegate in-court witness examinations. Likewise, even
in complex cases, law partners regularly delegate motion-writing and
exhibit-collection tasks to younger and cheaper attorneys but insist
on practicing and then presenting their own in-court arguments.
This cost-savings may be counterbalanced, to some extent, by the
court-perspective discussed above: Courts may save time in complex
cases by having attorneys and witnesses present in court, where they
(hopefully) present streamlined arguments and testimony and where
the judge can ask follow-up questions. The court, in other words, can
save time in complex cases, but at the cost of imposing more expense
on the parties who are likely to end up paying higher fees to finance
the simplified presentation.158
However, live fact-finding procedures may introduce burdens for
parties that are not so counterbalanced. One additional concern that
a litigant may have when an issue will be decided following a hearing
or trial is an increased chance of waiver of a legal or procedural right
by his attorney during the encounter.159 When appearing in court,
lawyers are subject to a substantial cognitive load: They must advance the goals of their client, keep a great deal of information organized in their head, respond to changing circumstances, and remain
alert for potential violations of evidentiary or procedural rules that
may worsen their client’s litigation position. Moreover, the ability of
lawyers working together on a team to solve problems collaboratively
is reduced by the necessity of nominating one advocate at a time to
conduct the presentation of arguments and the examination of witnesses, as well as by the necessity of confining communications between team members to scribbled notes and whispers. Under such
conditions, it is sensible for a client to worry that her lawyer may,
through a lapse of attention or through not possessing the knowledge
or insight of another team member, inadvertently waive the client’s
rights to object to evidentiary errors or procedural violations.
Live procedures, in other words, may reduce the ability of attorneys to be the best possible agents for their clients. This difficulty
158. As discussed supra at Part III, such higher costs may also have collateral consequences for the parties’ subjective assessments of procedural fairness if they push parties
into settling claims rather than pursuing them to a judicial decision. Because people generally value the opportunity to voice their grievances during a dispute resolution process,
they may find the overall process less satisfying if they are pushed to settle their cases, to
the extent that the negotiation process does not incorporate opportunities for voice. See
LIND, supra note 130, at 63; O’Hear, supra note 116, at 420-21.
159. See L. RONALD JORGESON, MOTION PRACTICE AND PERSUASION 21-23 (2006) (noting that an important goal during trial-court proceedings is to preserve issues for appellate
review and that useful appellate arguments are often “seemingly minor legal issues tucked
away in the record,” in contrast to the evidentiary arguments that seem important during
a hearing or trial).
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likely results in increased litigation costs, as clients hire higher quality, but more expensive, counsel in an attempt to prevent such lapses
from occurring. It might also result in a loss of control by the client
over the litigation, as lawyers fail to operate in the manner that the
client would prefer. In either event, a litigant would view the hearing
as having worsened her position.160
So in the end, a number of financial factors will make parties and
witnesses tend to favor paper procedures over live ones: the costs of
travel, the costs of preparing for live testimony, the added cost of
lawyer preparation time (due to the likely involvement of more senior
counsel when a presentation will be made to a court), and the increased risk of inadvertent waiver due to the cognitive and emotional
stress of the live environment.161 These concerns must be weighed
against the cost savings that courts may achieve by holding a hearing
or trial in cases where doing so will result in a simplified or clearer
picture of the dispute. In some cases, the party and witness concerns
might be minimized: The witnesses might be local or be able to be
examined telephonically, the attorney might be a solo practitioner
with a reputation as a skilled oral advocate and a preference for live
presentation, and the client might have faith in the attorney’s ability
to faithfully protect his interests in that environment. But in many
cases, the general intuition that live procedures add costs will be accurate: The evidence may be clear on the existing record, witness
travel may be necessary, the live procedure may draw more senior
(and hence more expensive) counsel to the case and result in more
elaborate witness preparation, and the live environment may lead to an
increased risk that attorneys will unwittingly waive their clients’ rights.

160. It is possible, and indeed likely, that some advocates will not suffer such a “live
procedure” performance deficit. Indeed, advocates whose time is spent primarily doing incourt work may be more effective in court than they are on paper. Cf. Robert P. Mosteller,
Why Defense Attorneys Cannot, But Do, Care About Innocence, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1,
45 (2010) (noting that some court-appointed lawyers are better paid for in-court time than
out-of-court time, and have a corresponding incentive to minimize pretrial work and to
seek trial time instead). This is mostly likely to be true for lawyers who specialize in fields
that involve a relatively large proportion of trial time; the majority of lawyers, by contrast,
spend far more time out of court than in it, and so are unlikely to have developed such
lopsided skill sets. See Luis Garicano & Thomas N. Hubbard, Specialization, Firms, and
Markets: The Division of Labor within and between Law Firms, 25 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 339,
345 (2009) (showing that those lawyers who on average spend more than ten days a month
in court—working in the fields of personal injury, divorce, and criminal law—make up less
than a quarter of the total population of lawyers, based on census data).
161. Some evidence suggests that they do, in fact, have this preference: Written summary judgment practice has become much more common than oral trial practice in the
federal courts. See BURNS, supra note 4, at 84. Parties who could choose either to file a
written dispositive motion or proceed directly towards trial, in other words, seem to prefer
the written procedure, and to settle their cases rather than face the live hearing.
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VI. THEORY RESTATEMENT, APPLICATIONS, AND IMPLICATIONS
FOR REFORM
Having examined three critical concerns that are implicated when
a decisionmaker must choose between live and paper-based procedures—accuracy, subjective fairness, and costs—we can now place
these concerns side by side and examine how they interact in actual
case scenarios. Some traditional uses of hearings and paper-based
decisions may be sensible, even if the traditional justifications for one
or the other were founded on mistaken notions about the utility of
demeanor evidence; in other settings, we may not be so lucky. In this
section, we will examine four examples in which a judge might have
the discretion162 to choose either to hold a hearing or trial, or to find
facts on a paper record: A preliminary-injunction decision, an automobile negligence case in small-claims court, a toxic-tort bench trial,
and a civil rape bench trial. These examples will help to illustrate
that live procedure generally works better early in the life of a case
than later on. I will then offer some proposals for rule reform to encourage judges to employ live procedure when it is useful and avoid it
when it is harmful.
A. Theory Restatement
Before we consider these examples, it may be useful to restate
briefly some of the considerations that may help us choose between
live and paper-based procedures:
Detecting Deceptive and Erroneous Testimony: Demeanor evidence is unlikely to aid the court in making credibility determinations. In some cases, live cross-examination may assist the court in
deciding credibility, but that utility will be limited to the extent that
witnesses have had significant opportunities to rehearse their testimony with lawyers who are aware of the likely subjects of crossexamination. If a transcript of a well-conducted deposition is available, it will usually be a more reliable and a fairer basis for determining whether a witness is testifying truthfully than live testimony.
Avoiding Unnecessary Appearance-Induced Bias: If a hearing or
trial will introduce the court to parties or witnesses for the first time,
it is likely that a court’s view of the evidence will be colored by irrelevant factors arising from visual and aural contact with witnesses.
These concerns include the biasing effects of witness attractiveness,
social status, and educational level, as well as in-group/out-group effects based on the similarities and differences between the judge and
the witnesses.
162. For the purpose of simplification, we shall assume that these cases are arising
either in a forum where there is no right to a jury trial or that the parties have elected to
try their cases to the bench.
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Clarifying Complex or Confusing Evidence: Live procedures may
induce parties to offer a simplified portrait of the issues before the
court. They may also give the court an opportunity to pin down vague
or confusing witnesses through sua sponte witness-interrogation by
the court. In cases where complexity is more of a problem than credibility, this counsels in favor of live proceedings.
Subjective Perceptions of Fairness: All other things being equal,
hearings may be more satisfying to parties who have the opportunity
to testify during the proceedings, given the value people place on
voicing grievances in connection with dispute resolution procedures.
Variations in satisfaction are likely to be modest, however, so long as
the paper procedure is relatively formal and respects the dignity of
litigants. Any deficits will be lowered further if the litigants view the
case as a business matter rather than an opportunity for personal
vindication. Furthermore, paper procedures may make the overall
litigation feel fairer when live procedures will be the more expensive
approach, largely because of the increased likelihood of a voice-less
settlement negotiation if an expensive hearing is the only option.
When litigants are likely to find a paper-based procedure unfair, this
concern may be partially mitigated by a court’s efforts to explain the
accuracy and fairness benefits of paper-based procedures to parties
and to justify its decisions by reference to the arguments actually offered by those parties. Finally, the parties’ desire for voice may also
be partially satisfied by opportunities to speak that occur after the
court has reached its decision.
Court Costs: Employing a paper procedure will sometimes save
valuable court time, helping a court to maintain an efficient pace in
moving through its docket. When a case involves a large amount of
technical evidence, the court may end up reviewing documents no
matter what, and a hearing or trial may simply be a duplication of
time. Paper-based decisions may also allow a court to delegate more
of the effort to law clerks, which may sometimes provide efficiency
advantages. On the other hand, when the evidence in a case is vague
or hard to follow, hearings may save court time by allowing a court to
ask its own questions.
Other Costs: Witnesses will generally prefer paper procedures, at
least if they will need to travel to attend a hearing or trial. Parties
who find it difficult to monitor their counsel’s performance may appreciate having an opportunity to observe their efforts in court. But
oftentimes, parties will find this advantage outweighed by the added
attorney costs that arise from preparing for a live procedure—
including the likelihood of being billed for the time of more senior attorneys and the increased agency costs that arise in the in-court litigation environment.
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With these principles in mind, let us consider how they might apply in some real-world examples.
B. The Preliminary Injunction Motion
For our first example, let us consider a motion for a preliminary
injunction under Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a
setting in which the district court often has nearly unfettered discretion to choose between live and paper-based fact-finding procedures.
Parties usually seek preliminary injunctions “to preserve the status
quo” until the case can be definitively resolved by settlement, pretrial
dismissal, or a trial on the merits.163 Following a long tradition of federal equity practice, district judges generally have broad discretion to
grant or deny such injunctions,164 and the rule is silent regarding the
methods of proving the facts necessary to determine whether an injunction is appropriate.165 District courts may therefore decide for
themselves, in many cases, whether to rely on affidavit evidence166 or
employ an evidentiary hearing.167 To the degree this discretion is constrained, it is by the traditional view of American courts that oral
hearings are necessary when the credibility of conflicting testimony
must be decided. In such cases, some courts of appeals (but not all)
will find that the failure to hold a hearing constituted an abuse of
discretion, unless both parties have consented to an affidavit-based
decision.168 For the purposes of this discussion, however, let us assume that the district court sits in a circuit, like the Ninth Circuit,
where it can freely choose between hearings and paper-based procedures, so as to focus on the underlying question of policy.
163. Penn v. San Juan Hospital, Inc., 528 F.2d 1181, 1185 (10th Cir. 1975); see also
11A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 2947 (2d ed. 1995).
164. See WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 163. Courts will typically weigh a number of factors in concluding whether a preliminary injunction is in the interest of justice,
including: “the significance of the threat of irreparable harm to plaintiff if the injunction is
not granted,” the amount of harm the injunction would cause the defendant, the likelihood
that the “plaintiff will succeed on the merits,” and “the public interest.” Id. at § 2948.
165. See FED. R. CIV. P. 65(a); cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 43(c). Unless the parties stipulate all
relevant facts or unless the losing party’s arguments are insufficient as a matter of law,
some fact-finding will be necessary, as district courts will not rely on the unproven allegations in a pleading to justify injunctive relief. See WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note
163, at § 2949 & n.12 (collecting cases).
166. See, e.g., S. F.-Oakland Newspaper Guild v. Kennedy, 412 F.2d 541, 546 (9th Cir. 1969).
167. See, e.g., Wounded Knee Legal Def./Offense Comm. v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation,
507 F.2d 1281, 1287 (8th Cir. 1974); see also Aoude v. Mobil Oil Corp., 862 F.2d 890, 894
(1st Cir. 1988) (stating that, in some cases, the use of a paper trial to decide fact disputes
relating to a preliminary injunction motion was within a district court’s discretion, but that
an oral hearing is preferable whenever there is doubt that a party can fairly present its
case via affidavits).
168. See WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 163, at § 2949 & n.29 (collecting cases
and discussing this rule). But see, e.g., S.F.-Oakland Newspaper Guild, 412 F.2d at 546
(applying contrary Ninth Circuit rule).
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In most cases, the theory of hearings outlined above would suggest
that an evidentiary hearing is more useful at this stage of the case
than a decision that relies only on affidavits, at least if the factual
disputes are reasonably complex. Although some point to a need to
consider demeanor evidence to resolve fact conflicts in this setting,169
this argument is relatively weak given that such evidence is more
likely to decrease the accuracy of credibility calls in this setting than it is
to increase it.170 But many other factors do weigh in favor of a hearing.
First, there are the other accuracy considerations. Although the
demeanor problem exists as much here as in other cases, it is counteracted to an extent by the increased utility of cross-examination at
this relatively early stage. Witnesses will likely receive less coaching,
and have less access to the other side’s evidence and arguments, in
preparation for such a hearing,171 so cross-examination may be more
likely to usefully ferret out fabrications and mistakes in their testimony. This advantage becomes more apparent when we consider that
the alternative is usually to rely on affidavit evidence rather than
depositions: Affidavits, which do not require a witness to answer
questions put forth by opposing counsel, may paper over the gaps in
an account rather than probe them. The availability of crossexamination therefore takes on special importance here. Furthermore, the judge may have little familiarity with the facts of the case
at this early stage, so the ability to ask follow-up questions may be
particularly helpful.
Second, there is the question of subjective fairness. As we have
already seen, the desire of litigants for expressive opportunities can
be furthered by giving them an opportunity to testify in court. The
countervailing possibility—that the cost of the hearing will be high
enough to force a settlement, thereby reducing opportunities for parties to voice their complaints—does exist in this context, but to a
lesser degree than in other cases, given that preliminary injunction
hearings will usually be shorter—and involve less preparation—than
trials.172 So, on balance, a hearing procedure will seem fairer to the
litigants involved.
Finally, there is the question of cost. Some of the above defects in
the efficacy of a paper procedure could be cured, no doubt, if we allowed more extensive discovery (especially deposition practice) before
169. WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 163, at § 2949.
170. See supra Part II.
171. See Lee T. Gesmer & Jay Shepard, Employee Non-Competition Agreements, in II MASSACHUSETTS EMPLOYMENT LAW § 20.7.2 (John F. Adkins & Nancy S. Shilepsky eds., 2009)
(noting that lawyers often have only “a few days” to prepare for preliminary injunction hearings).
172. See discussion infra Part V.D-E; see also Gesmer & Shepard, supra note 171, at §
20.7.2; Morton Denlow, The Motion for a Preliminary Injunction: Time for a Uniform Federal
Standard, 22 REV. LITIG. 495, 507 (2003) (noting that such hearings are less formal than
trials on the merits and involve the presentation of a smaller quantity of available evidence).
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a preliminary injunction hearing. But such discovery would be impractical, given that the necessary delay would clash with the “haste
that is often necessary to preserve the relative positions of the parties and to protect the movant from irreparable injury.”173 Given these time constraints, there is less reason to worry about the intense
level of witness preparation that normally adds to the cost of live
hearing procedures. Moreover, the less-formal nature of preliminary
injunction hearings makes it more likely that the judge will allow
cost-saving devices like the telephonic testimony of remote witnesses.174 Finally, a hurried briefing schedule may make it more likely that written submissions will have gaps or ambiguities; thus, it
might save the court time to have a live hearing at which these gaps
can be filled in, rather than having to puzzle over cryptic submissions
in chambers. All in all, the preliminary injunction hearing is a situation in which the judicial instinct favoring live presentation is sound,
even if the demeanor-focused reasoning underlying that instinct has
little to recommend it.
C. The Case in Small Claims Court
Next, let us consider a setting in which cost considerations become
paramount: the small-claims court. Every state has a forum in which
relatively minor disputes, involving low amounts-in-controversy, are
handled using “expedited and simpli[fied]” procedures.175 In this setting, “traditional rules of evidence and court processes do not apply,”176 and the use of attorney representation is rarely costeffective—and sometimes, it is not permitted.177 One such simplified
procedure is to use highly simplified pleadings,178 followed by an oral
evidentiary hearing at which the pro se parties may testify and introduce witness testimony or other evidence.179

173. Denlow, supra note 172, at 507.
174. See id.
175. Bruce Zucker & Monica Her, The People’s Court Examined: A Legal and Empirical
Analysis of the Small Claims Court System, 37 U.S.F. L. REV. 315, 317 (2003). The lowest
jurisdictional limits for small claims courts in the United States are set at $1,000 (Virginia), while “the highest limits are in Georgia and Tennessee, with limits of $15,000.” Id.
at 318. The mean limit is $4,504. Id. at 320 tbl.1.
176. Id. at 317.
177. Id. at 319, 327; see Scott Sabey & Tim Shea, Small Claims Court: A Conversation
with Scott Sabey and Tim Shea, 19 UTAH B. J. (75th SPECIAL ANNIVERSARY ISSUE), no. 6,
2006 at 32, 34 (noting that even after Utah raised its jurisdictional limit to $7,500, “relatively few” parties in small claims court were represented by counsel).
178. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 116.320 (Deering 1991 & Supp. 2009) (only requiring a plaintiff to plead the names and addresses of the defendants, the dollar amount
of the claim, and a simple description of its basis); see also Zucker & Her, supra note 175,
at 325-29 (describing the California process); accord Sabey & Shea, supra note 177 at 32-33
(describing similar Utah process).
179. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 116.520 (Deering 1991).
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In such a setting, the live procedure is clearly the only sensible
choice for dispute resolution, even if the dispute centers on a simple
credibility conflict. First, the accuracy consequences of potentially
misleading demeanor evidence are less severe; due to the amount-incontroversy limits, the fiscal loss resulting from a mistaken decision
is contained to relatively tolerable levels.180 What is more, the accuracy advantages of hearings may be more likely to show themselves
in this context. Any briefing will be prepared by inexpert pro se parties who do not know the relevant law and will likely be confusing, so
that a judge’s own questions will take on a special utility. Furthermore, the likelihood that witnesses will have been carefully prepared
for cross-examination is at its lowest in the small-claims setting, and
even if the parties lack the skill to effectively cross-examine the witnesses, the judge can provide some credibility-probing questioning of
his own.181 These clarity-producing factors might outweigh the accuracy losses we can expect due to the impact of demeanor evidence on
credibility determinations and the appearance-bias problem.
When we place the remaining factors on the scale, the answer is
even clearer. As we have seen, litigants gain satisfaction from expressing their views to a decisionmaker. Nor is there any concern
here that the added cost of a hearing will force parties into low-voice
settlement negotiations: If anything, the cost equation runs the other
way. In proceedings in which discovery is almost non-existent and
lawyers rarely assist litigants, the preparation of an adequate record
for a paper-based decision presents very high cost obstacles for litigants; adding the necessary deposition practice and requiring the
drafting of lengthy briefs might deter many parties from suing at all,
due to the expense of hiring a lawyer or the information costs of
learning how to handle such tasks personally. Oral hearings, therefore,
turn out to be a clearly superior method of resolving very small claims.
D. The Toxic Tort Bench Trial
Now, let us turn our attention from preliminary or low-value matters to a category of cases in which the decision between live and paper procedures will be much more challenging: The resolution of tort
claims premised on exposure to allegedly dangerous chemicals. Such
cases involve many added wrinkles beyond the “ordinary” trial; most
180. Note that to say this is not to suggest that the financial consequences of a mistake
in a small case do not matter to the parties. But from an economic perspective, an increased chance of losing a smaller amount of money is always preferable to a similar
chance of losing a larger amount.
181. See, e.g., Steve Averett, Small Claims Courts, 16 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 179, 183 (2001)
(noting that in Utah, a small claims judge will be responsible for questioning witnesses);
Gerald Lebovits, Small Claims Courts Offer Prompt Adjudication Based on Substantive
Law, 70 N.Y. ST. B. J. 6, 10 (1998) (noting that in New York, small claims judges “tak[e]
active charge of the proceedings and examining witnesses”).
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significantly, from our perspective, plaintiffs will often have to establish, using scientific expert testimony, a causative link between exposure to a particular substance and infirmities suffered many years
later.182 Let us presume, for the sake of simplicity, that the parties
have consented to a bench trial, and that they are willing to consider
the use of a paper procedure in order to conserve costs. So the question is presented squarely to the court: Is a paper trial the best way
of resolving this case?183
Here, it will be hard to clearly decide between the procedures on
the basis of accuracy criteria. For the sake of analysis, we can break
down our hypothetical case into two important things that a plaintiff
must prove. First, was she exposed to a chemical produced by the defendant, and second, did that substance cause her subsequent maladies?184 The first issue mainly involves historical proof—subject to
significant uncertainty in the large subset of cases that involve a long
latency period—with the same concerns we normally have regarding
demeanor and appearance bias. The second issue, however, involves
very little focus on the plaintiff’s credibility and instead requires a
lengthy excursion into the arcana of scientific evidence. In such a setting, the risk that paper briefing will be confusing or vague becomes
more significant, and the value of dialogue between judges and expert witnesses rises. To a large extent, then, the accuracy inquiry will
depend on which aspect of the case predominates: In some “mature”
types of toxic torts, causation might be clearly established by precedent, so that the main question is whether the plaintiff was exposed
to the substance as a result of the defendant’s actions.185 Other cases,
however, might involve a single supplier of a substance and little dispute on exposure, with the inquiry turning entirely on the scientific
causation question.186
What then of the other factors? Given the complexity described
above, it should neither be surprising that toxic tort cases often last
longer than the typical trial nor that the use of testifying scientific

182. See Jamie A. Grodsky, Genomics and Toxic Torts: Dismantling the Risk-Injury
Divide, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1671, 1677-78 (2007); J. Michael Veron, The Trial of Toxic Torts:
Scientific Evidence in the Wake of Daubert, 57 LA. L. REV. 647, 648-49 (1997).
183. See Gingras v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., No. 06 C 2195, 2007 WL 1052500, at *7
(N.D. Ill. Apr. 4, 2007) (considering whether a paper trial was the best way of resolving a
dispute even though all parties had consented to the procedure).
184. Veron, supra note 182, at 648.
185. See Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy in the Law of Class Actions,
1999 SUP. CT. REV. 337, 343, 357 (providing modern asbestos claims as a paradigmatic
example of such a “mature” toxic tort).
186. See Young K. Lee, Note, Beyond Gatekeeping: Class Certification, Judicial Oversight, and the Promotion of Scientific Research in “Immature” Pharmaceutical Torts, 105
COLUM. L. REV. 1905, 1908-09 (2005) (describing the “immature” tort category, in which
claims of scientific causation are novel and undeveloped in previous cases).
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experts makes these long trials even more expensive.187 To the extent
that a paper trial can reduce the need for lengthy witnesspreparation sessions, decrease the need for expensive court days, and
shift some of the lawyering labor to lower-cost associates, we might
plausibly expect it to create significant cost economies as compared
with a live trial.188
By reducing the incentive to settle, the paper trial may increase
voice opportunities as well.189 In some cases, the issue of voice will be
of reduced significance, in particular in cases where the plaintiff
would not be testifying even in a live proceeding.190 In others, a court
will need to weigh the extent of possible cost reductions and their
impact on likely voice opportunities, as well as any concerns about
difficult credibility judgments being undermined by demeanor and
appearance bias, against the clarity gains that a live hearing might
provide to the scientific causation questions. To the extent that the
parties are stipulating to a paper procedure, a court might decide
reasonably that the cost factors are quite significant and that the
voice opportunity favors a paper decision over no decision, which
could indicate that a paper trial is preferable. But, in the end, it is
the court that has to render a decision that will depend on a clear
understanding of the scientific dispute in the case. So if the court
finds itself significantly troubled by the difficulty of comprehending
the scientific issues on briefs alone and by the inefficiencies of trying
to do so without an opportunity to interact with the experts themselves, the call might reasonably go the other way.

187. See Judicial Conf. of the U.S., Rep. of the Judicial Conf. Ad Hoc Comm, on Asbestos
Litigation 10-14 (1991) (describing the complexity and lengthiness of asbestos-exposure trials).
188. One cost in particular where a significant economy could be realized is in the area
of expert witness fees. For one thing, merely paying such witnesses to travel can be a significant burden. See MAUET, supra note 156, at 357 (noting that the travel costs of expert
witnesses can be substantial). Moreover, expert witnesses will already have prepared a
written summary of their findings in most cases, see FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2)(B), making the
additional costs of testifying duplicative of an already-prepared written submission.
189. See discussion supra Part III.
190. Testimony will be unlikely, for example, if the defendant has stipulated the issue
of exposure and damages, or if these issues have already been resolved in the first half of a
bifurcated proceeding. Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 42(b) (giving the District Courts discretion to try
issues separately). On the flip side, however, we should not necessarily discount the importance of voice on the defendant’s side, even if the defendant party is a corporation that
cannot “speak” in a literal sense. Although the nominal defendant may not have feelings or
expectations that can be violated in a low-voice condition, it is nevertheless made up of
individuals whose experiences should be counted in the procedural justice calculus. Cf.
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 928 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(urging that “the individual person’s right to speak includes the right to speak in association with other individual persons,” even if the form of association is a business corporation
(emphasis omitted)). Indeed, to the extent that the perceived legitimacy of the proceedings
implicates decree-following and law-compliance concerns, society’s interest in encouraging
such compliance may be heightened when the party at issue is a powerful corporation.
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E. The Civil Rape Bench Trial
Finally, let us consider an example in which the accuracy interest
and the subjective fairness interest collide with unusual severity: a
civil rape trial.191 Victims of sexual assault appear to be raising such
claims with increasing frequency,192 often suing both the claimed assailant and third-party defendants who, they allege, failed to employ
reasonable precautions to prevent sexual assaults on their property.193 Although these claims might traditionally seem like obvious
candidates for live, confrontational trials, paper procedures are arguably superior in most instances.
First, the accuracy factor will generally favor a paper trial in these
cases. The factual dispute in civil rape cases will often boil down to a
simple swearing contest between the alleged victim and the alleged
perpetrator.194 In many cases, the victim and the assailant will be
acquaintances or intimates, and the defense will be that the sexual
contact was consensual.195 The trier of fact will therefore be making a
decision that hinges on whether the alleged victim or the alleged assailant is a more credible witness.196
This is exactly the sort of case in which the live procedure is most
likely to bias fair inferences regarding witness credibility. Nervousness and discomfort at testifying might result in a hesitant delivery
that appears deceptive,197 while a well-rehearsed, confident witness
may inspire an amount of trust that is ill-deserved. Likewise, the
possibility that judgments of credibility may be skewed in favor of those
parties who are attractive, high-status, or who happen to share salient
191. Once again, for the sake of avoiding doctrinal complexities and focusing on the
underlying policy question, we will assume that the parties have consented to a bench trial
and are willing to consider a paper trial procedure.
192. See Ellen M. Bublick, Tort Suits Filed by Rape and Sexual Assault Victims in Civil
Courts: Lessons for Courts, Classrooms and Constituencies, 59 SMU L. REV. 55, 58-59
(2006) (reporting a ten-fold increase in reported state-court appellate opinions on this subject between the early 1970s and the early 2000s).
193. Id. at 61.
194. See JEANNE C. MARSH, ALISON GEIST & NATHAN CAPLAN, RAPE AND THE LIMITS OF
LAW REFORM 20-21, 35 (1982) (reporting data showing that less than half of the criminal
sexual conduct cases studied involved charges that the defendant either employed actual
force or threatened force involving a deadly weapon). In the absence of injury, many rape
cases will necessarily rely on competing testimony about conduct and apparent consent.
195. See JENNIFER TEMKIN & BARBARA KRAHÉ, SEXUAL ASSAULT AND THE JUSTICE GAP:
A QUESTION OF ATTITUDE 11 (2008) (noting that, in a majority of the most severe sexual
assaults reported in the British Crime Survey, the victim and perpetrator were intimates);
Susan J. Lea, Ursula Lanvers & Steve Shaw, Attrition in Rape Cases: Developing a Profile
and Identifying Relevant Factors, 43 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 583, 590 (2003) (noting that the
victim and perpetrator are intimately related in twenty-four percent of reported cases and
that they are acquaintances or relatives in fifty percent of the cases).
196. TEMKIN & KRAHÉ, supra note 195, at 167-68.
197. Id. at 129 (describing the ease with which defense barristers can undermine a
nervous rape complainant’s credibility).
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characteristics with the fact-finder is deeply troubling, suggesting a
danger that the system will subtly but systematically privilege powerful people with the right to sexually victimize the less-fortunate.198
As to the subjective fairness considerations, the analysis is more
nuanced. In such suits, the ability of a victim to voice her complaint
in an authoritative forum takes on particular importance, especially
in light of the underwhelming success of the criminal justice system
in obtaining convictions in rape cases.199 If police or prosecutors do
not consider her case to be worth pursuing, a civil court may be the
only forum in which the victim can express her grievance and seek an
official declaration that she was wronged.200 And the accused defendants, being publicly charged with breaching some of society’s bedrock norms, may have a profound desire to personally counter the
accusations and confront the accuser.
Nevertheless, there are also strong subjective fairness reasons
why we might wish to avoid a live rape trial. Many rape plaintiffs
will have suffered substantial psychological trauma and may be very
reluctant to be physically present in the same room with their attacker.201 So although they might desire “voice” to the extent that
they want to tell their story and have it recognized by legal officials,
they may find the traditional trial environment more threatening
and unpleasant than a deposition would be. So although there are
still very real voice concerns in these cases, some of which (such as
the defendant’s preferences) might still counsel in favor of a live trial,
there are also subjective fairness reasons to favor a paper procedure.
The best way to handle such a situation—where accuracy concerns
counsel strongly in favor of a paper trial, but where at least one litigant may feel very dissatisfied with that mode of proceeding—is to go
ahead with the paper trial while doing everything that is possible to
make it palatable. As outlined above,202 the negative voice effects of
paper-based procedure can be minimized via a number of methods.
First, the court can try and provide alternative avenues for party expression, even if those opportunities do not directly contribute to the
evidentiary basis of the decision. If trying to maximize the parties’
198. Cf. Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 66 (2008)
(noting that members of ethnic minority groups are “overrepresented . . . among rape . . .
convicts,” and also that they are more likely to be exonerated for their crimes than is the
norm among rape convicts).
199. See Joan McGregor, Introduction to Symposium on Philosophical Issues in Rape Law,
11 LAW & PHIL. 1, 2 (1992) (”The likelihood of a [rape] complaint actually ending in conviction
is generally estimated at two to five percent.”); see also David P. Bryden & Sonja Lengnick,
Rape in the Criminal Justice System, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1194, 1209 (1997)
(“The relatively few cases that proceed to trial often end with an acquittal or a hung jury.”).
200. See Bublick, supra note 192, at 68.
201. See Melanie Randall, Domestic Violence and the Construction of “Ideal Victims”:
Assaulted Women’s “Image Problems” in Law, 23 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 107, 136-37 (2004).
202. See supra Part III.
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trust in a paper-based procedure, a court could first encourage them
to participate in a non-binding form of alternative dispute resolution—such as a summary jury trial203—in which they would be able to
voice their disputes without biasing a decisionmaker who would issue
a binding judgment in their case.204 If the parties do not settle after
this initial exploration of their dispute,205 the court can explain the
need for an absent procedure and seek the parties’ explicit consent,
thus explicitly tying the procedure to a desire for fair adjudication.
This may reduce the likelihood that the parties will perceive the
court’s desire to dispense with a hearing as a signal of disrespect for
the parties or as an indication that the court does not take their dispute seriously. Next, after it has reached a view of the merits of the
case based on the written submissions, the court could permit the
parties to briefly articulate their claims in open court, if they wished,
before announcing that decision. This will allow those parties who
desire further opportunities for voice to speak directly to the court
while minimizing the likelihood that their expressive opportunity
will decrease the accuracy of the decision. Finally, when announcing
its decision, the court should summarize the parties’ main arguments
and testimony and then explain its reasons for accepting one account
and rejecting the other, thus clearly indicating that it considered
their written submissions with care. With such an approach, a court
can assure that the decision is as accurate as possible while minimizing any loss of legitimacy that might arise from the use of a paperbased procedure in such a delicate setting.
With these examples, a few things have hopefully become clear.
Although the demeanor-evidence rationale for preferring live adjudication as a means of resolving evidentiary disputes has little to recommend it, there are many situations in which a live hearing is nevertheless the best way to proceed. Indeed, at early stages of a lawsuit
and in low-stakes cases, hearing-based procedures will usually be
preferable to paper-based ones. But, in higher-stakes disputes with a
203. A summary jury trial is a “non-binding abbreviated trial[] by mock jurors who are
chosen from the jury pool.” Donna Shestowsky, Improving Summary Jury Trials: Insights
from Psychology, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 469, 470 (2003) (quotation marks omitted). The goal is to have the summary jurors issue a verdict that can “provide the starting
point for settlement negotiations.” Id. at 471.
204. Ideally, such a procedure would incorporate protections for the privacy and trauma of the plaintiff, such as separating the two parties so that they do not come into contact
when they speak before the summary jurors.
205. Note that the concern discussed above—that settlement would harm parties by
excluding voice opportunities—could be mitigated here, if the summary jury procedure was
modified to incorporate opportunities for the parties to testify briefly. Cf. id. at 472 & n.13
(noting that live witness testimony is normally not employed at a summary trial, but that
it is an option that lawyers sometimes elect); Thomas R. Mulroy, Jr. & Andrea B. Friedlander, Trial Techniques: A Discussion of Summary Jury Trials and the Use of Mock Juries, 24 TORT & INS. L.J. 563, 564 (1989) (noting that lawyers can chose to present live witness testimony “in abbreviated form”).
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well-developed record and an incentive to extensively prepare for a
hearing, both accuracy and cost considerations start to favor paper
procedures, and the overall decision becomes more nuanced. In some
cases, if credibility is of less importance but the need of the court to
comprehend complex evidence is a more pressing concern, a hearing
may still be preferable. But in cases in which credibility is a central
concern and a great deal rides on the accuracy of the outcome, it may
be best for courts to employ paper-based procedures if they are available,
in order to avoid the biasing effects of witness demeanor and appearance,
while attending carefully to the consequences of such an approach on
participant and observer assessments of procedural fairness.
F. Implications for Law Reform
The above analysis suggests that in some respects, such as our
tendency to use oral hearings to resolve very small cases, or the preference of some courts for oral evidentiary hearings at the preliminary
injunction stage, our legal systems are striking an appropriate balance between the accuracy, the perceived fairness, and the costs of
fact-finding procedures. In other respects, however, our approach to
fact-finding in civil cases seems upside-down. Most notably, paperbased fact-finding is rarest at the end of cases, which is precisely
when it is likely to be most useful. Moreover, courts faced with choosing between live and paper-based procedures often fall back on the
faulty premise that credibility conflicts favor live hearings, when in
fact they favor a paper-based approach. So, there is clearly a large
amount of room for improvement.
Luckily, actors at all levels of the legal system can make choices
that will help remedy the defects of our present system. Lawyers can
get better justice at lower cost by attending to the real costs and benefits of these differing approaches to fact-finding and by asking for
procedures that will actually serve their interests. Judges, likewise,
can exercise their discretion to hold more live evidentiary hearings
early on in the evolution of cases, when they will be most useful. On
the flip-side, judges should be more willing to employ paper-based
procedures at the trial stage, especially if the parties have consented
to them, even if the controversy involves credibility disputes. Their
freedom to do so may be limited by the practical constraints of the
jury trial process, but they should feel freer to experiment with paper-based fact-finding in lieu of bench trials.
Much of the blame for the present situation must lie with rulemakers, however. The complex policies in this arena no doubt make
it hard to write categorical rules requiring live fact-finding in some
settings and a paper-based process in others. But other approaches
would improve on the current model. Let us consider, for example,
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. These rules are mostly silent
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regarding how pretrial fact-finding is to be conducted when it is necessary,206 and Rule 43(c) suggests that judges may choose freely between affidavits, depositions, and oral testimony when finding facts
during motion practice.207 Moreover, they suggest (although they do
not explicitly state) that paper trials are improper: Rule 43(a) requires that, “[a]t trial, the witnesses’ testimony must be taken in
open court,”208 and Rule 52 instructs that “[i]n an action tried on the
facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court must find the
facts specially and state its conclusions of law separately.”209 Although some judges read the language of Rule 52 to permit paper trials,210 the phrase “tried on the facts” seems to invoke Rule 43’s mandate of oral proof at trial, and (perhaps because of these doubts),
courts generally proceed to try cases on paper only by consent of both
parties, requiring in effect a waiver of the right to an oral trial.211
A better approach would give trial judges explicit discretion to
choose between the two procedures in all fact-finding settings, thus
allowing room for judges to decide between the procedures on a case
by case basis. At the same time, such a rule should provide guidance
as to which factors weigh in favor of each approach, given the poor
state of judicial intuitions on this subject. Finally, given the significant accuracy and cost advantages that can often be attained by using
a paper trial, the rules should allow courts to dispense with live procedures in some cases where both parties do not consent to the procedure. A good rule might provide as follows:
(1). At all stages of cases tried to the bench, or when pretrial factfinding is necessary in jury-trial cases, the court may find facts
based either based on paper submissions (which may include affidavits, deposition testimony, and documentary evidence) or based
206. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 12 (setting forth a number of pretrial motions that can
result in the dismissal of a case, some of which require factual proof, but giving no guidance as to how such facts should be demonstrated); FED. R. CIV. P. 19 (similarly silent as to
the method of proving the facts necessary to support dismissals for failure to join necessary
parties); FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (silent as to how parties should prove the factual basis for class
action certification); FED. R. CIV. P. 37 (silent as to how parties should prove the existence
of discovery violations when seeking sanctions); FED. R. CIV. P. 65 (referring to preliminary
injunction “hearing[s]” but not specifying whether they should involve testimony or whether argument on affidavit evidence is sufficient). The primary exception to this silence is
Rule 56, which provides that parties seeking summary judgment should show the absence
of disputed facts using paper submissions of affidavits and depositions. But this is the exception that proves the rule, because motions for summary judgment do not require the
court to engage in actual fact-finding, but rather require only the identification of factual
disputes. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).
207. FED. R. CIV. P. 43(c) (“When a motion relies on facts outside the record, the court may
hear the matter on affidavits or may hear it wholly or partly on oral testimony or on depositions.”).
208. Id. 43(a).
209. Id. 52(a)(1).
210. See Denlow, supra note 37, at 31, 34 n.6. (collecting cases).
211. See, e.g., id.; Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Jostens, Inc., 155 F.3d 140, 142-3 (2d Cir.
1998); see also Market Street Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 590 (7th Cir. 1991).
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on live witness testimony.
(2). In exercising its discretion to choose between these methods of
proof, the court should be guided by the following principles:
(a) Early in a case, live testimony is usually preferable for reasons of cost and clarity.
(b) Later in a case, including at the trial stage, paper proof will
often be more accurate and less expensive.
(c) To the extent that credibility disputes arise, a paper procedure
is likely to be more accurate than an oral one. Therefore, a desire
to observe the demeanor of witnesses when making credibility
determinations is not a proper reason to order live presentation.
(d) The joint consent of the parties to either mode of evidence
presentation counsels strongly in favor of that method, but is
not dispositive.
(e) The court may allow a brief statement from each party before issuing its decision in a paper trial case, in order to give
aggrieved litigants an opportunity to address the court directly
without undue risk of biasing the resulting decision.

Although an admittedly radical change from present practice, such a rule
would do a much better job balancing accuracy, satisfaction, and costs
than the approach currently embodied in federal rules and practice.
VII. CONCLUSION
As we have seen, the conventional wisdom regarding live evidentiary hearings and trials—that they increase the accuracy of decisions by allowing fact-finders to use witness demeanor to make better
credibility calls—is wrong. In fact, the live appearance of witnesses
has a much larger downside than judges or commentators have previously appreciated; in addition to the fact that demeanor cues generally impair, rather than aid, credibility judgments, there are a
number of cognitive biases that may arise from having one’s first impressions of a witness be visual and auditory impressions. These include a persistent human tendency to trust or distrust witnesses
based on their physical attractiveness, their social status, their race,
or other features that may make them similar to, or different than,
the decisionmaker.
But the fact that live testimony rarely aids credibility judgments
does not make it useless. Sometimes live presentation allows for more
effective witness examination—although this opportunity will grow less
likely if a witness is well prepared to rebut cross-examination questions.
More commonly, a hearing or trial provides a forum in which a judge
can interact with witnesses, enabling her to cut through confusion or
evasion with her own questioning. In addition, live proceedings often feel
fairer to participants than paper-based decisions, due in large part to
the desire to have expressive input in decisions that affect us. And sometimes a live hearing may be preferable for reasons of cost or practicality.
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In the end, it would be naïve to suggest that one procedure is preferable to the other in all possible circumstances. Instead, when deciding which procedure to favor, a decisionmaker—whether it be a lawyer deciding what to ask for, a judge exercising a discretionary choice
between alternatives, or a rulemaker trying to guide or constrain
that discretion—should attend to the situational costs and benefits of
each procedure. In general, live procedures will be more useful early
in the life of a case, and in low-value, highly cost-constrained cases,
whereas paper procedures will usually be preferable for late-stage
fact-finding. This means that the dominant approach to fact-finding
in American civil procedure—in which a largely paper-based pretrial
process is followed by a live trial—has little to recommend it. Although the constitutional right to a jury trial may place limits on our
ability to design a better system, one obvious reform implication is to
give trial courts the discretion to choose freely between live hearings
and paper trials in cases tried to the bench, and encourage them to
use each procedure when it is most advantageous. To that end, I hope
the enumeration of relevant policy factors in this Article, as well as a
proposed rule to implement those factors into day-to-day court decisionmaking, may serve some use.

